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This paper applies an interpretation of how globalization and governance (G&G) interact with convergence
given Cape Verde and Mozambique’s particular geographical and historical contexts. We hold that
development success under globalization entails, necessarily but not exclusively, positive market perceptions
regarding the orientation and predictability of policies as well as the accompanying institutional arrangements.
As such, a positive G&G interaction with respect to a comparator group can usefully be defined as
success notwithstanding the inexistence of a universally applicable development model. In practical
terms, we first identify macro-level policy and institutional combinations underpinning successful
trade diversification (an indicator of globalization) and income convergence (an indicator of governance)
in the sub-regions of West and Southern Africa. We then assess to what extent these combinations
apply to both countries using an empirical analysis. We find that trade openness drives convergence
and export diversification in Western Africa (which is becoming more diversified) while convergence
is instead driven by economic and political freedoms in Southern Africa (which is becoming more
specialized). Our empirical analysis is complemented by a case-study narrative of Cape Verde and
Mozambique’s long-term development, which allows us to also identify the following common drivers:
moving towards a market economy; opening up to regional and global trade; increasing economic
and political freedom; pursing macroeconomic stability and financial reputation; ensuring policy continuity
(especially in the industrial and trade sectors) and focusing on human development (especially education
and poverty reduction). Moreover, both countries reveal convergence compared to their sub-regional
peers when looking at average GDP per capita and indicators of financial reputation and good governance.
While these findings are insufficient to conclude that convergence will be sustained, the positive interaction
between trade and financial globalization, on the one hand, and good governance and democracy, on
the other, may help explain the observed diversity of the Portuguese-speaking African community,
which includes three other countries (Angola, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé e Príncipe).
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The global financial crisis turned the risk of excluding Africa economies from globalization 
into the certainty that poverty would worsen in most of them. Prior to this crisis, however, 
Africa accompanied the trend of sustained growth evidenced by emerging economies. 
Primarily due to the implementation of adequate structural and macroeconomic policies, 
growth was the strongest in decades (AEO, various issues; World Bank, 2009). In Sub-
Saharan Africa, GDP growth increased from an average of 3.5 % in 2000 to 5.7 % by 2005 
and Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, none of which is a 
major primary commodity producer, were able to post annual growth rates of over 5 % in 
recent years (United Nations Africa Report, 2008). 
 
Indeed, the expansion, diversification and deepening of trade and financial links between 
countries over several decades presented an unparalleled opportunity for some to raise their 
living standards and achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Notwithstanding 
Africa’s improved economic situation, absolute poverty was still widespread when 
unprecedented energy and food price volatility brought worldwide expansion to a halt. Amidst 
dire global economic prospects, growth enhancing policies need to be assessed against 
progress on MDG, including the global partnership on development and prospects for 
international cooperation.  
 
The evidence suggests that development success under globalization is less a question of 
relative resource endowments or geographical location than in past waves of globalization. 
Market perception of the orientation and predictability of national economic policies, and the 
accompanying institutional arrangements, have proved to be decisive everywhere. The Asian 
crises of the mid 1990s showed that economic openness must be accompanied by good public  
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and private sector governance in order for countries to take full advantage of globalization. 
Examples of the former include sound macroeconomic policies, unfailing transparency, stable 
and rational incentive frameworks and robust financial systems coupled with effective 
supervisory and regulatory mechanisms.  
 
Severe regulatory failures in developed countries, uncovered by the global crisis, confirmed 
that there is no universally applicable development model. Adequate governance responses to 
globalization thus become all the more important as globalization reduces national policy 
space and increases institutional and economic interdependence at various levels. At the same 
time, a more integrated global economic context necessarily demands greater policy and 
institutional coherence as well the knowledge required to implement the associated reforms 
and monitor them through effective peer review mechanisms.  
 
To be sure, even among the highly integrated economies of the Eurozone, neither coherence 
nor knowledge were able to respond to the challenge posed by the global crisis. Nevertheless, 
regional economic cooperation remains a valid intermediate step toward the integration of 
developing countries into the world economy
2. In addition to benefiting from regional 
economies of scale, their participation in reform programs within regional organizations also 
facilitates domestic authorities’ work when implementing politically difficult measures. In the 
wake of the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the diverse perspectives of the 27 EU 
member states have at last found an institutional framework. Even though the financial 
challenges remain daunting for several highly indebted member states, especially those inside 
the Eurozone, alternatives to cooperative responses consistent with regional integration have 
not been found. Indeed, the success of the EU attests to the advantages of among like-minded  
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countries, where a combination of cultural proximity and mutual knowledge facilitated the 
deepening of the integration process from a free trade area to a single currency and the 
widening from the original six members through successive enlargements.  
 
With respect to Africa, regional surveillance and peer pressure between the various partners 
have been set up and implemented over the last eight years: the African Peer Review 
Mechanism has involved 30 countries of which 12 have been examined
3. Broader regional 
surveillance may help reduce the risks of macroeconomic slippage, resulting in a more stable, 
predictable environment – an essential factor for the private sector to flourish. Among French-
speaking countries in West and central African (so-called CFA), particularly those pegged to 
the euro, surveillance has been a driving force of economic policy coordination and integration 
even though in the 1980s enforcing the stability of the nominal exchange rate against the 
French franc led to unstable real effective exchange rates. The monetary allocation mechanism 
managed by the French Treasury kept the parity between the French franc and the CFA from 
1948 until the devaluation of the latter in 1994, which led to a real depreciation in most 
members of the West African Monetary Union
4. Their long experience with a monetary policy 
conducted by a strong institution that must preserve its independence vis-à-vis national 
governments has accustomed these countries to yielding some of their economic policy 
matters to a regional organization. In comparison to CFA common institutions, those in the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, which includes Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo), and the Southern African Development 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 Macedo (2010) describes the implications of the crisis for international governance innovation and analyzes the 
peer review mechanism of the IMF for the G20 drawing on Niels Thygesen’s label on peer pressure by proxy at 
IMF and by commitment at EU. See also Macedo (2008). 
3 5 were examined from July 2002 to 2007, 4 in 2008 and AEO (2009, p. 75) expected 6 but only 3 (including 
Mozambique) were carried out in 2009 (AEO, 2010, p. 72) plus Mauritius in the 13
th Forum in Kampala in late  
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Community (SADC, which includes Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have not yet been effective constituencies for 
reform. If the ECOWAS and SADC secretariats (in Abuja, Nigeria and Gabarone, Botswana 
respectively) were to cooperate with the Commission for the African Union, or the local 
offices of global organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, better interaction between globalization and governance would probably 
follow. With peer pressure, better information on the 15 partners in each one of the sub-
regions and beyond would probably be available, facilitating business development and a 
more active role for civil society
5.  
 
The idea of producing usable information from within a cooperative framework is what we 
mean by “mutual knowledge”, a term used in a declaration on MDG approved at the 2006 
summit of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) held in Bissau
6. Mutual 
knowledge is generally more limited and the data harder to compare outside of the OECD so 
that cooperation at the regional, sub-regional and international levels may neither produce 
knowledge of effective policies or institutions nor create conditions for their implementation. 
In fact, context-adjusted but also widely usable knowledge only results from identifying an 
appropriate constituency for each set of related problems and challenges. Reaching the MDG 
in 2015, for example, presupposed sustained pro-poor economic growth in addition to better 
                                                                                                                                                          
July. The effectiveness of mutual control devices reflects the extent to which cooperation overcomes collective 
action barriers and clears the ground for coherent reforms (Kanbur, 2004). 
4 Macedo (1986, p. 358) discusses the paradox of nominal stability and real instability in CFA countries. 
5 Some group averages below exclude Nigeria and South Africa because their GDP weight is too large. CPLP 
and NAFTA both have 1.4 members equivalent. See note 17 below. 
6 Aside from five African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe), 
Brazil and Portugal are founding members, Timor Leste joined in 2001 while Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and 
Senegal are associate members, the former having applied for full membership at the 2010 CPLP summit in 
Luanda. On CPLP, Macedo (2008) draws on a 2003 report for the OECD secretary general. Other useful 
references to work carried out along with the AEO report (produced since 2001) are in OECD (2003) and IICT 
(2007), the first comparative report on the 2006 Bissau declaration.  
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governance and more aid, but there were no immediately available recipes on how to bring 
about a positive interaction between globalization and governance
7. In other words, 
alternatives to both the “one size fit all” and “each case is unique” development approaches 
are urgently needed in a context which cannot draw upon existing experiences of institutional 
cooperation that foster mutual trust and generate mutual knowledge. Under these 
circumstances, the quest for African development successes remains a policy as well as a 
research priority, especially acute in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a nutshell, what is at stake for 
many African countries is how to ensure that current policy and institutional arrangements in 
the spheres of trade, finance, debt, investment and technology mutually reinforce each other in 
support of equitable, rapid and sustainable growth and development. 
 
Against this background, we assess the extent to which Cape Verde and Mozambique may 
represent development successes in West and Southern Africa. Specifically, we seek to identify 
lessons for successful governance based on meaningful regional comparisons of Cape Verde 
and Mozambique's development experience. These lessons will also be drawn from the study 
of the complementarity of economic policies and accompanying institutional arrangements 
bearing on trade, finance and competitiveness. We realize the limitations that lack of data 
impose on this ambitious agenda but, in our view, identifying such lessons necessarily entails a 
broader scope of analysis than is usual. Moreover, by analyzing these countries in comparison 
with their neighbors we may also contribute towards greater mutual knowledge on economic 
development issues within CPLP and especially among the five PALOP.  
 
                                                 
7 Bourguignon et al. (2008) underline the heterogeneity of country outcomes and the difficulty in finding patterns 
even in fragile states. This heterogeneity is no surprise: to “develop a global partnership for development”, the 
eighth MDG goal, reflects disappointment with the performance of developing countries which seemed to follow 
the policy recommendations of the “Washington consensus” during the 1990s. As governance improvements 
were not commensurate with the challenges of globalization, especially in what concerns financial markets, these 
countries faced recurrent financial crises which interrupted the long term convergence process.  
7 
The emphasis on identifying the linkages between cultural, institutional and economic factors 
that fostered growth and development remains in this paper, organized as follows. Our 
interpretative framework, detailed in section 2, focuses on the interaction between 
globalization and governance, which may be positive or negative depending on the policies 
and accompanying institutional arrangements. Specifically, we hold that economic success 
under globalization entails, necessarily but not exclusively, positive market perceptions 
regarding outcomes such as export diversification and narrowing of the income gap with 
respect to the frontier. Success thus defined must, in turn, be underpinned by good governance 
and the freedoms that citizens and residents enjoy, which section 2 also discusses. Section 3, 
meanwhile, provides an historical and geographical perspective on Africa with comparisons in 
the sub-region as well as PALOP. Section 4 estimates the factors that determine export 
diversification, measured by the number equivalent Herfindahl index, and income growth 
strategies in comparison to sub-regional averages. Section 5 offers a narrative of long-term 
development in Cape Verde and Mozambique with respect to Foreign Trade and Economic 
Growth and Macroeconomic Policy and Financial Reputation. Once again, policy and 
institutional reforms provide context for good governance indicators and progress towards the 
MDG in a separate sub-section. The concluding section 6 raises the issue of whether 
cooperative governance and peer-review mechanisms are capable of sustaining African 
development successes when due account is taken of the diversity of experiences evident from 
ECOWAS, SADC and PALOP.  
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2. Interpreting how Globalization and Governance interact with Convergence  
 
Policy and institutional responses must necessarily change as the nature of globalization itself 
changes. Indeed, different waves of globalization (15th, 19th and 20th centuries, including the 
past decade) have interacted with different forms of governance responses. The interaction of 
globalization and governance is always context-specific, as defined by space (geography) and 
time (history). In the wave since the 1990s, the context is captured by convergence, often 
measure as the gap in per capita income relative to the frontier, and by democracy, often 
measured in terms of electoral competition and political participation but best understood by 
its constituent political and economic elements
8. To enhance the quality of the democracy 
measure, we look at the index of political rights and of civil liberties published by Freedom 
House and at the indexes of economic freedom published by the Fraser Institute and the 
Heritage Foundation. The Freedom House Index defines democracy as a concept with 
attributes of political rights and civil liberties. Political rights include the right to vote, fair and 
free competition for the office, the presence of multiple parties and decentralized political 
power. Civil liberties refer to the existence of a free press, open public discussion and freedom 
of speech and assembly. The indices are ranked as follows: 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties  Economic Freedom 
7 = maximum political rights 
1 = minimum political rights 
10 = maximum economic freedom 
0 = minimum economic freedom 
 
Since political rights and civil liberties are highly correlated, we replace them with the average 
of both (labeled prcl in Appendix 1). This composite indicator performed better in estimation 
and, in addition, it also has the advantage of being interpretable as an index of political 
                                                 
8 Przeworski et al. (2000). Garoupa and Tavares (2009) show that higher income increases the survivability of 
democracy but they label a country as democratic if its governments are designated through elections in which 
more than one party competes and the winning party is not always the same. Persson and Tabellini (2006) 
introduce quality considerations through the concept of democratic capital. The age of democracy is labeled 
demage below.  
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freedom, given that it captures its two mains constituent components. We also note that these 
measures must be used and interpreted with caution due to well known issues, most of which 
derive from the process of index construction itself, as pointed out by Oman and Arndt (2006) 
and Luiz (2008), and that Fedderkke et al. (2001) applied an improved method to South 
Africa. Below we draw on Luiz et al (2010) which have computed indexes of political and 
economic governance for Mozambique over the last 100 years.  
 
These caveats should be borne in mind when reading some of our results. Countries are rated 
according to two 7-point scales, with 1 being the highest score for both scales. The sum of the 
points obtained in the scales classifies the country as free (2-5), partly free (6-10) or not free 
(11-14). The Freedom House Index dates from 1995 and includes data on ten components: 
Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary 
Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property Rights, Freedom from 
Corruption and Labor Freedom. Each component is measured by various indicators and is 
assigned a grade in a scale of 0 to 100. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an 
overall economic freedom score for each country. Although the definition of economic 
freedom is quite vague, and consequently measuring it lacks some precision, the index gains 
relevance worldwide as several studies reveal that there is an important relationship between 
economic freedom and positive social and economic values such as per capita income, 
economic growth rates, human development, democracy, the elimination of poverty, and 
environmental protection. Political rights are associated with free and fair elections for the 
executive and legislative branches of power, freedom to constitute political parties, freedom of 
association, independence from political, religion and military authorities, real possibilities of 
the change of power and other related aspects of the political system. Key elements of civil 
liberties include freedom of thought, religion, association, free press and respect for the rights  
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of minorities. The concept of economic freedom is more difficult to define as it may relate 
only to private ownership, prices being determined by market forces, de jure and de facto 
entry and exit, efficient rule of law and official economic regulation guaranteeing competition 
or also include the financial freedom brought about by currency convertibility, stability of 
money value, central bank independence and deep financial markets. Furthermore, the widely 
used indexes include low taxes, a small share of government spending in GDP and flexible 
labor markets, and this appears to some as too extensive a definition of economic freedom. 
Once again the Luiz et al (2010) index for Mozambique avoids some of these pitfalls by 
distinguishing carefully between the rules of the game and their outcomes. 
 
Macedo (2001) reports that trade openness reduces perceived corruption, even after correcting 
for its endogeneity, and claims that this was the way in which globalization improves 
governance, given highly significant historical control variables (e.g. protestant tradition, de 
facto democracy and OECD membership). Eichengreen and Leblang (2006) find a two-way 
interaction between democracy and globalization over the entire 1870-2000 period, 
distinguishing trade from financial openness but measuring democracy as a dichotomous 
variable. By introducing the extension of suffrage, for example, a negative interaction between 
democracy and debt default has been found for the period of the classical gold standard, with a 
more than proportional effect in capital-poor countries. At the time, parliamentary 
democracies were seen as sources of financial stability, to the extent that the checks and 
controls on the sovereign implied a greater ability to tax
9. This contradicts the widespread 
view that the repression of democracy facilitated the operation of the pre-1914 international 
monetary system by making external adjustment easier during the second wave of 
globalization. Over the period 1970-2004, the different types of freedom interact differently 
                                                 
9 Flandreau and Zummer (2004, p. 44) report an elasticity of 0.5 for the whole sample and of 1.3 for capital-poor 
countries.   
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with the trade and financial globalization variables, and the interaction becomes more 
sensitive to regional context and to stages of national economic and institutional 
development
10. Overall, allowing for the quality of democracy lowers the overall effect of 
globalization on democracy. One reason for this is the hypothesis that globalization’s effects 
on democracy are mediated by slow-moving cultural values, which may, in turn, be associated 
with weaker constituencies for policy reform. This would imply that such variables might be 
accounted for by selecting groups of like-minded countries, like the OECD, for which the 
effect of globalization on freedoms would be stronger but this would neglect the convergence 
dimension, more visible on a global scale. Eichengreen and Leblang’s (2006) also use a 
measure, “Age of Democracy” (labeled demage in Appendix 1), which counts for each 
country i at time t the number of uninterrupted year up to time t that country i has been 
democratic, i.e. its measures the length of time a country has been a democracy which is used 
in section 4 below. In addition, we employ data from the POLITY project, which codes 
countries’ level of democracy as a function of institutional rules
11. This project is also the source 
of information on constitutional age. POLITY defines constitutional change as occurring either 
when there is a political transition or when the absolute value of the score changes by at least 
three points. This allows for constitutional changes in both democracies and dictatorships.  
 
Given these measures, the mutual relationship between globalization, governance and 
economic performance can be described along the following lines: a nation’s resource 
endowments and its productivity determine how fast it can grow and the level of its economic 
well-being in terms of income per capita, both in absolute terms and relative to the income 
frontier. Feed-backs are possible: a richer country growing fast may invest more resources in 
scientific research and technology development and thus enjoy higher productivity levels than 
                                                 
10 Section 4 below tests this result, reported in Macedo et al (2007), on ECOWAS and SADC in the form of the 
diversification-convergence interaction.  
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a poorer, slow-growing economy. Through trade, capital flows or migration, globalization can 
influence the level of endowments available in an economy, or even, through international 
technology transfers, its productivity. Conversely a country’s endowments of natural 
resources, labor, and capital, as well as its geographic location and efficiency of its production 
structures may determine how much it trades with the rest of the world in terms if goods, 
services and assets. Similarly, a country with good governance, namely a democratic state with 
high-quality institutions, effective corruption-free accountable bureaucracies, and a flourishing 
civil society may likely increase the quality, if not the quantity, of its most important 
endowment: its own people. Once more, cause and effect can be swapped: well-endowed 
countries may evolve towards democratic forms of government more easily, or, at least, they 
may afford investing more resources to build well-functioning institutions
12.  
 
While these interactions have been at the core of economics, this has not been the case of the 
issue addressed in this section (“how globalization and governance interact with 
convergence”), perhaps because of the interdisciplinary nature of globalization waves and of 
governance innovation - even when the distance to frontier is not as fundamental as it is for 
Africa. With respect to the relative strengths of the links between the current wave of 
globalization, the benchmark measure of freedoms and convergence, the empirical findings of 
Macedo et al (2007) reveal that political rights and civil liberties had a significant impact in 
the run-up to the third wave of globalization while feedbacks were somewhat weaker. As 
mentioned, further work is needed to understand the long-run dynamics and sustainability of 
this global system, in particular the mechanisms that could enforce or reinforce the expected 
positive effect of globalization on both convergence and freedoms. The particular interaction 
which involves democracy reflects historical, geographical, social, cultural, institutional and 
                                                                                                                                                          
11 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
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economic factors and the method employed focuses on the economic aspect of this 
relationship. A complementary explanation of the interaction between globalization and 
governance can be based on the manner in which diversity, be it socio-cultural or economic is 
addressed by a given society
13. This is taken up in the next section, with specific reference to 
the historical roots of CPLP in the first wave of globalization, associated with the Iberian 
maritime explorations of the 15th century. 
 
The available empirical evidence regarding the relationship between economic growth and 
political regime is weak or inconclusive, as discussed in Kohli (1986), Remmer (1990) and 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993). In the case of Africa, it is not possible to establish a clear link 
between political regime and economic growth according to Young (1998), amongst others. 
However, the poor economic performance of many of its authoritarian regimes during the 
1980s suggests that these failed to promote economic growth. Indeed, Maravall (1995) notes 
that “a strong case can be made that economic reforms are more likely to succeed in a 
democratic political context. Political pluralism generates more and better information to use 
in economic decision making; moreover, democratic institutions may reduce the transaction 
costs of economic reforms, as well as restrict predation of public resources.” Looking at the 
Economic Freedom Index in Sub-Saharan Africa, we see that it is not only the poorest but also 
the most economically repressed world region: no country belong in the group of 
economically free countries, 7 are listed in the “mostly free group”, 28 in the “mostly not-
free” and 7 in the “repressed” group. More worrisomely, in the region, a decline in economic 
freedom is evident. Factors like corruption, excessive market regulation or the size of black 
                                                                                                                                                          
12 Bonaglia et al. (2009). Transport technology also changes costs, sometimes dramatically, making them very 
different from distance, as documented by Feyrery (2008). 
13 Indeed, one of the constants of human organization is the “absolute certainty that man will never be common, 
he will always de different, he will always give rise to diversity. And society, by managing this diversity, will 
manage prosperity and the creation of wealth” (Borges de Macedo 1996, p.194). The same holds true, of course, 
for the case of political diversity and whether peace or conflict ensues. The distinct processes of colonization of  
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market are among the reasons for such a poor result. Using the variables listed in Appendix 1, 
results presented in section 4 suggest that, in both West and Southern Africa, economic 
convergence increases with political and economic freedom. Even though it warrants further 
investigation, the focus on the management of diversity as a determinant of positive G&G 
interactions, especially that pertaining to policy and institutional reform, is especially 
necessary in connection with Africa.  In this case, the knowledge thereabout is certainly less 
“mutual” than with respect to other regions, even outside of the OECD. 
 
3. History and Geography  
3.1. World Regions 
Three “regions” (North America, EU, ASEAN + China, Korea, Japan) account for ¼ each of 
world GDP. Africa is in the “rest of the world” which includes over ½ of world population, 
with other significant actors (Brazil, Russia, India) and salient regions (Middle East). Taking a 
global view should foster governance innovation, as dominant players have different strengths 
(Nye, 2002). Yet free rider problems prevent cooperation among abstract regions, especially 
those where there are no peer review mechanisms let alone a culture of cross-cutting 
intergovernmental cooperation, as seemed to be the case in the rest of the world significant 
actors and even in China, certainly before the creation of the Group of 20 (Macedo, 2010). In 
addition, around 70 “fragile states”, most of which located in Africa, are very specific in their 
fragility (Bourguignon et al 2008).  
 
Looking at the rest of the world, the share of world GDP accounted for by Africa plus South 
America combined doubled from 1820 to 1950. The share remained constant since at around 
10% with North America and EU roughly equal to Asia (including Japan, Russia and Turkey), 
shares that are comparable to those prevailing in 1820. In 1950, however, North America and 
                                                                                                                                                          
the Americas is chosen to illustrate the importance of diversity and how it is managed as being a crucial  
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EU accounted for 60% and Asia for 30%. In terms of population Africa and South America 
combined have more than doubled their combined world share from 10% in 1820 to 15% in 
1950 to 22% in 2003 while Asia has dropped from ¾ to ½ and then rose again to 2/3. In terms 
of GDP per capita, the relative shares are ½ for Africa and South America combined and over 
2/3 for Asia.  
 
As emphasized in AEO (2010, box 2.2), strengthening the capacity of the national statistical 
systems is required for a results based management framework which in turn helps regional 
integration processes based on peer review
14. The partnership known as PARIS21, hosted by 
the OECD, has been in operation since 1999 and on its tenth anniversary produced the Dakar 
declaration on the development of statistics
15. Table 3.1 presents a statistical capacity indicator 
the five highest ranking countries and the five PALOP, noting that only three of the former are 
in Sub Saharan Africa. Indeed, the data drawn from the impressive database of the late Angus 
Maddison underscores this lack of knowledge. In year 1 there are only estimates of GDP for 
the five North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), estimates of 
GDP for Ghana and South Africa begin in 1820 and for the remaining Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries in 1950. The share of Africa in world GDP falls from over 4% to under 3% in 1000, 
1% in 1500 and around .8% until 1820, when it begins to rise to about 1.2% in 1913. In 1950, 
when estimates for 34 new countries become available, the Africa share reaches under 4% 
again while Sub-Saharan Africa remains just under 3%. Since then both shares have declined 
about 1pp of world GDP. As for the share of SSA in Africa, it rose from around 20% until 34% 
in 1913 and more than doubled to ¾ in 1950. Thereafter the Sub-Saharan share of Africa GDP 
                                                                                                                                                          
determinant of the interaction between economic and political organization in Macedo et al (2007).  
14 This objective also comprised part of the ‘capacity building’ initiatives in Africa undertaken by the World 
Bank during the 1990s. These entailed promoting technical expertise and data base construction, e.g. population 
census and socio-economic surveys. 
15 One year before, the Lisbon declaration on science for global development included the promotion of science 
and technology indicators for CPLP by CGIAR and other organizations: www.iict.pt,  
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declined by more than 10 pp but West (=ECOWAS) and Southern (=SADC) shares in Sub-
Saharan Africa remain at 40% and 30% respectively. The increase in population has been such 
that the relative stability in the share of world GDP implies a decline in GDP per capita of 
about 20 %age points, from 42% of world GDP per capita in 1950 to 24% in 2003. The 
corresponding figure for Sub-Saharan Africa is 18%, forecast by IMF to rise to 21% in 2013.  
 
The views of “development as self discovery” (Haussman and Rodrik, 2003) and the “ladder 
of competitiveness” (Causa and Cohen, 2006) suggest measures of competitiveness that go 
beyond relative unit labor costs (Branson et al 1987) and other refinements to the country 
narratives presented below. The main point, once again, is that diversity must be taken into 
account. While the impressive database used in Maddison (2007) has been criticized, it allows 
a “millennial” perspective on world regions and helps to avoid the pitfalls of a purely 
geographic approach
16. Regions may be historical rather than geographical and interaction 
during the first wave of globalization and even the second did not involve nearly as many 
players as the current one. The complementarity between globalization and regional 
integration and the development paradigm based on mutual accountability first contained in 
the 2002 Monterrey declaration on MDG both suggest that in Africa interaction between 
globalization and governance has been weak. At the same time there is evidence that 
complementary reforms are not a “luxury” for developing countries (Macedo et al 2009c). 
 
3.2. Africa and Portuguese–speaking countries  
3.2.1. The common historical legacy 
                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.iict.pt/workshop/papers.asp including Giovaninni et al (2008) on statistics and good governance and 
Macedo (2008) on CPLP, drawing on IICT (2007) and work at OECD in note 7 above. 
16 Maddison (2001, p. 71-75) acknowledges the specificity of the Portuguese empire. Amaral (2009) revisits the 
Portuguese transition to democracy during the second wave of globalization. Macedo and Pereira (2007) were 
inspired to study the diversity of Portugal’s and Portuguese speaking countries’ responses to globalization by 
drawing on the concept of “differenciality” due to Borges de Macedo and discussed in Macedo et al. (2009a).   
17 
The combination of Africa and South America is more obvious when the Atlantic side is 
considered. In effect, Mozambique was ruled from Goa in India during the first wave of 
globalization and the influence remained after the forced union with the Spanish Crown 
(1580-1640) but India suffered the competition from Brazil during the 1700s.  
 
Contrary to what is sometimes believed, there was a fair amount of decentralization in the 
Portuguese empire even before the departure of the Crown Regent to Brazil in the wake of the 
first Napoleonic invasion in 1807 essentially moved the capital to the New World (Maxwell, 
2004). The Crown remained in Rio de Janeiro after the congress of Vienna and the liberal 
revolution of the 1820s. Brazil remained an empire until 1890 and was therefore the sole 
monarchy in the Americas during most of the 19
th century. On the other side, the dispute 
between the two sons of the Regent led to the sole civil war in Portugal’s history which lasted 
from the independence of Brazil in the early 1820s until the defeat of the absolutist brother 
Miguel in 1834. In spite of a successful stabilization in the 1850s when it joined the gold 
standard, Portugal suffered from the 1890 crisis and the currency became inconvertible until 
1992 (Macedo et al. 1996). The transition of Brazil from Empire to Republic coincided with 
the financial crisis and the first default quickly followed the one of Portugal.  
 
Similarly, the successive revolutions in 1910, 1918, 1926 and 1974 influenced the 
independence of the former African colonies, together with their own very diverse initial 
experiences with political and economic freedom. For example, the presumption that political 
freedom is incompatible with financial instead of complementary damages financial reputation 
considerably because when political rights decrease the capacity to tax, countries become 
serial defaulters; but Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show that they are also capable of  
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graduating
17. More recently, the experience of Portugal with IMF adjustment programs may 




Our motivation for studying these countries reflects previous attempts to contribute towards 
greater mutual knowledge within the CPLP with respect to the MDG (IICT, 2007; Macedo, 
2008). Indeed, the Declaration on MDG in CPLP (approved at the 2006 Bissau summit 
mentioned in the introduction) sees cooperative governance as capable of producing “mutual 
knowledge” among the eight member states based on the fact that the standards of 
appropriateness regarding policy and institutional reform may be less responsive to geography 
than to historical affinities. In spite of their geographical discontinuity, five Portuguese-
speaking African countries formed the PALOP group in 1979, and held ten summits until 
1992, when they signed the first Regional Indicative Program with the EU. With Timor-Leste 
joining in 2001, there are now six ACP Portuguese-speaking countries cooperating under the 
10th European Development Fund. They signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
European Commission on the eve of the second Europe-Africa summit in late 2007, which 
extended to CPLP. Future activities, integrated into a multi-country approach, focus on 
democratic governance as a key determinant for poverty reduction
19. 
 
Moreover, it is widely recognized, within the development community, that both countries are 
actively seeking to overcome adverse developmental conditions, either due to geography 
(Cape Verde is a small island state devoid of natural resources) or history (Mozambique fought 
                                                 
17 Tables 6.1-2-4-6, pp. 86-99 record one bankruptcy in Portugal from 1300 until 1812 (against 7 in Spain and 9 
in France), six are recorded until 1890 (against 7 in Spain and zero in France and Brazil).  Thus the share of 
years in default since independence or 1800 is similar in Brazil and Spain (Table 10.2, p. 149) while France 
stands out for the share in a banking crisis.   
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a protracted civil war following independence). Cape Verde, for example, signed a five year 
contract in 2005 with the Millennium Challenge Corporation even though it was above the 
income per capita ceiling that determined eligibility. This was largely seen as an incentive for 
the country to continue its efforts on the development front. As expected, graduation to middle 
income status occurred in late 2007 and, at the suggestion of Luxemburg and Portugal, Cape 
Verde also signed a special partnership with the EU. Mozambique, meanwhile, was eligible for 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation since its inception in 2004.  
 
Given Africa’s diversity, then, assessing development successes requires comparisons among 
partners in sub-regional organizations which include members with different cultural, 
historical and strategic affinities. ECOWAS was established in 1975 and SADC in 1980, and 
each now includes 15 countries, as listed above. The experience of Cape Verde and 
Mozambique is systematically compared to the ECOWAS and SADC average but also to Sub-
Saharan Africa and PALOP. Table 3.2 summarizes the various sizes relevant to the 
comparisons in the next section, including comparisons between PALOP and CPLP and the 




Common features in the five PALOP may reflect institutions preceding independence, in spite 
of very diverse experiences with political and economic freedom since then. Like Portugal 
during the first half of the 19
th century and again after the 1890 bankruptcy, financial 
reputation suffers when political rights decrease the capacity to tax. Like Portugal since 1979, 
                                                                                                                                                          
18 Bliss and Macedo (1990) and Macedo (2009). Using Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) again, the change from 1979 
to 2008 in the credit rating from Institutional Investor (Table 17.2, p. 285) is 19 points in Spain and Greece but 
33 in Portugal, reaching 90, 85 and 81 respectively in 2008 (Table 17.2, p. 285). 
19 In relation to poverty reduction, see Paul Collier (2007) and especially Collier and Gunning (1999). 
20 The weight of Brazil is of course overwhelming and the four micro states never rise above 25 basis points of 
GDP in 1990 international dollars, the number equivalent of NAFTA, as indicated in note 5 above.  
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some PALOP have been able to improve their credit rating through appropriate policies. It is 
therefore useful to preface the estimation of diversification-convergence regimes in West and 
Southern Africa with a reference to the contrasting political culture of Cape Verde and 
Mozambique.  
The comparative evolution of GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars from 1950 until 
2006 for PALOP and Sub-Saharan Africa averages shows a more volatile growth pattern for 
the former group with more pronounced growth in the 1950s and the last decade (Figure 3.1). 
This reflects civil wars following independence especially in Angola and Mozambique, the 
two larger economies. In spite of the common colonial history, the pattern of each one of the 
five PALOP is very specific: Figures 3.2a and b compare GDP per capita in Cape Verde and 
Mozambique to the respective sub-regional averages from over six decades
21. According to 
AEO, Cape Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Angola is the ranking 
which applies to export diversification, political and economic freedom as well as corruption 
perception in PALOP: Tables 3.3 through 3.5 present the latest data available and will be 
detailed below for the first and third ranked.  
 
In regional terms, current SADC countries showed greater export diversification than those of 
ECOWAS or the average for Sub-Saharan Africa since 1960, as measured by the number 
equivalent Herfindahl index. Export diversification in Mozambique and Cape Verde also tend 
to be higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa average but the number equivalent varies a great deal 
(Table 3.6): data for Cape Verde begins in 1976 and in Mozambique recent large scale 
investments determined both a strong increase in the exports and an increase in specialization. 
The decrease in export diversification in Mozambique followed a strong expansion of one 
                                                 
21 The source is Maddison database which contains two outliers for GDP of Cape Verde in million GK$. The 
series is 1990: 430; 1991: 283; 1992: 231; 1993: 434 and the correction was interpolating the two outliers, so 
that GDP per capita growth is smoothed during those years. Frankel (2010) presents governance rankings 
alongside GDP per capita figures consistent with the ranking in the text.   
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single industrial product rather than from a decrease in the exports of other products. In all six 
governance indicators reported in Table 3.7, Cape Verde scores higher than the ECOWAS 
average and Mozambique performs better than the SADC average in three of them, as detailed 
in section 5.2 below. 
 
(Insert Tables 3.2 through 3.7. and Figure 3.1 through 3.2b here) 
 
Comparing GDP growth rates of the both countries since 1950 shows a growth differential of 
almost 2% for Cape Verde relative to ECOWAS whereas Mozambique growth is slightly 
below that of SADC. The decade averages show the greater volatility of Mozambique’s output 
with two decades of negative growth, whereas in Cape Verde there was a negative differential 
of 4 pp in the 1970s. While this difference has roots in the colonial period, the pattern was 
reinforced after independence, as described next.  
3.2.2. Cape Verde  
After achieving independence in 1975, Cape Verde was governed under a one-party system 
that pursued an inward-looking, activist development program based on central planning and 
an economically dominant public sector, particularly in banking, transportation, insurance and 
energy (IMF, 1999). Motivated by the need to overcome the colonial legacy while minimizing 
the risk of possible political resistance, the new government adopted a protectionist trade 
regime and controlled the economy directly. As consequence, there was limited scope for 
competitive export promotion and foreign direct investment was also discouraged: the 
resulting loss of competitiveness and the reduction of foreign direct investment became major 
constraints for sustainable long-run growth (Lourenço and Foy, 2003). As of 1988, a wide-
ranging program of reforms aimed at trade liberalization and privatization reduced the 
government’s role to essentially that of building badly needed infrastructure but the country  
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was governed under a one-party system until 1990. Popular dissatisfaction led to free 
legislative and presidential elections and a constitutional amendment establishing a multi-party 
system in 1991. Economic reforms gathered further pace after the country held free elections. 
The Movement for Democracy (MPD) took power away from the African Party for the 
Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) that had led Cape Verde since independence and 
amended the 1980 constitution to allow for a multiparty democracy. The MPD government 
continued the economic reforms started by its predecessor, especially those pertaining to 
financial and foreign exchange markets. Since the adoption of this regime, there have been 
three legislative elections with results considered to be non-fraudulent and two orderly 
changes in government.  
 
Indeed, the fact that democratic governance has taken root is widely recognized by various 
governance indicators. The 2008 Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks Cape Verde 
second overall in a sample comprising 48 Sub-Saharan countries. Cape Verde has good results 
in terms of safety and security, sustainable economic opportunity, participation and human 
rights and human development when compared to its peers, with safety and security obtaining 
the highest score and sustainable economic opportunity the lowest. Data from the Freedom 
House Index also confirms the good results of Cape Verde in terms of political stability: Cape 
Verde is defined as free, obtaining the highest scores (1) for political rights and civil liberties. 
The presence of “creolisation / métissage” from the first settlers helped promote the view of 
peace and development. This “peace culture” has been reinforced by the absence of civil strife 
and by the impressive performance in terms of MDG, reflecting political stability, security, 
good governance and functioning democratic institutions. The insular nation, without natural 
resources, has become an example of best practice: its neutrality in the region lead to its role 
of mediator – good reputation (“donors’ darling”), leadership in UN reform and using culture  
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as a means of promoting tourism and development
22.  
 
3.2.3. Mozambique  
Three different governance regimes can be identified: the pre-independence period (1960-
1974), the post-independence period, which was marked by civil war (1975-1992) and the 
post-peace accord period (1993 onwards)
23. Following independence, economic growth was 
stunted by a civil war estimated to have killed up to one million people. It is also affected by 
the Marxist-socialist ideology espoused by the governments in the immediate post-
independence period. Prior to independence, there was significant public investment in 
infrastructure and also expenditures in health and education during the period 1960-73, which 
contributed strongly to Mozambique’s growth. In agricultural sector, it was generally true that 
large private farms performed better than smaller ones, and therefore accounted for the bulk of 
agricultural output. However, the post-independence economy was very much government-
controlled. By 1984, for example, more than half of all registered firms were state-owned. Not 
unexpectedly, the development of a market-economy was severely hampered, which impacted 
negatively on growth. During the 1980’s, Mozambique began gradually moving away from a 
centrally planned economy, e.g. price controls on vegetables and fruits were removed. Another 
example is the enactment of 1987 Economic Rehabilitation Program, which led to a strong 
shift toward market-based economic policies and the pursuit of structural reforms. These 
included the stabilization of the exchange rate, trade liberalization, extensive privatizations 
                                                 
22 The argument in Santos (2010) is based on a Ph.D. dissertation in peace studies a la Galtung (1996) where she 
analyzes the thought of Amilcar Cabral (1975, 1999) who led the liberation struggle of Cape Verde and Guinea 
Bissau and influenced leaders of several other colonies especially Angola (Cabral, 1995, 1987; Andrade, 1978). 
Surprisingly she leaves out Cardoso (1986) which is seen as very influential. Another useful reference is the 
acceptance speech of an honorary doctorate from the Technical University of Lisbon on 26 May by the current 
Head of State (Pires, 2010). However, Lourenço and Foy (2003) claim that the resulting loss of competitiveness 
and the reduction of foreign direct investment became major constraints for sustainable long-run growth during 
this period. 
23 Tibana (2003) performs a trend and a business cycle analysis in the post-peace accord period, pointing out 
different growth behaviours within it. Such periods are: an immediate post-war recuperation (1992-94), a period 
of slow growth and heavy infrastructure investment (1995-2000) and a strong-growth period (2000-02).  
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and tariff and financial sector reforms. However, it was only after the consolidation of peace 
that any significant improvements had the opportunity to occur. A contributing factor to a 
quick post-conflict development was the UN-led program of exchanging guns for vouchers 
which allowed an easier transition from war to peace. While it was soon discontinued because 
of difficulties in redeeming these vouchers, the program remains a success in confidence 
building. Following the signing of the 1992 Rome treaty, a new constitution was adopted that 
allowed for democratic elections and progress further toward a market-economy. A prosperous 
transition after the peace accord allows Mozambique’s economic performance to be compared 
to the best performers in the sub-region, namely Mauritius and South Africa. Nevertheless, the 
rehabilitation and political transition took a few years, before the mega-projects such as the 
MOZAL aluminum smelter plant and the Witbank highway, connecting Mozambique and 
South Africa were implemented in 1996-99, leading to the take-off of growth after 2000. 
According to Tibana (2003), economic activity increased from 1991 until 1995 but slowed 
down during the preparation and implementation of the mega-projects that came to define the 
country’s export behavior and high-rates of economic growth. Over the past decade, 
Mozambique has again become one of the attractive economies in the sub-region, as revealed 
by Luiz et al (2010) from where Figure 3.3 is reproduced.  
 
4. Analyzing the Convergence-Diversification Relationship 
In this section, we study the two-way relationship between trade diversification and income 
convergence motivated by the insights provided by our interpretative framework and the 
empirical finding that economic development, measured by per capita income, entails more 
diversification. The general observation is that economies become more diversified as incomes 
increase before reaching a turning point, which Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) estimate to be 
around USD 9000 per capita, beyond which they become less diversified, a stage not yet  
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observed in the Sub-Saharan Africa database used by Cabral and Veiga (2010) which includes 
data disaggregated at five different levels, according to the categories of the SITC trade data 
(Rev2)
24. In other words, development occurs when a country learns how to do new things and 
focus on those that it already does well, such as producing new goods, choosing promising 
export markets, upgrading product quality and moving into services exports. We note, in 
passing, that another strand of literature argues that diversification should focus on exporting 
more sophisticated products as these entail higher productivity levels conducive to higher 
growth levels (e.g. Hausmann et al, 2007). In this case, a country becomes what it exports, i.e. 
countries converge to the level of income implied by their exports
25. The common point in 
both approaches, however, is that product development is undoubtedly an important engine of 
growth for developing countries.   
 
The study of how economic policy and institutional variables promote or limit the capability 
of countries to pursue successful export diversification and sophistication strategies serves as 
background for the identification of the factors that determined the success obtained by Cape 
Verde and Mozambique. Using regression analysis in a panel of 48 countries and 45 years, 
Cabral and Veiga (2010) establish that the stage of development and the economy’s size are 
positively correlated with export diversification, and that economies with larger GDPs or 
populations also have higher export sophistication levels. Moreover, both diversification and 
sophistication are promoted by trade integration, efforts to reduce transport costs as well as 
improvements in institutional, political and educational factors.  
 
                                                 
24 Cabral and Veiga (2010) present mostly results with more disaggregated data, since the results tend to be 
stronger and more accurate than when the 1 and 2 digit categories are chosen. They add in note 12 on page 15 
that the results remain broadly similar independently of the level of disaggregation used.  
25 The issue of export sophistication is analyzed in Cabral and Veiga (2010) and note 16 above.  
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When used to explain export diversification, 19 out of the 26 governance variables presented 
significant positive signs. The results were particularly robust for the variables reflecting 
government accountability, respect for the rule of law, political stability, effectiveness, and 
control of corruption (Table 3.7 above). In export sophistication regressions, 15 out of 26 
variables are not statistically significant but “transparency”, “accountability” and “control of 
corruption in the public sector”, “debt policy and fiscal policy rating”, “economic management 
cluster average” and “policies for social inclusion” have a positive association.  
 
Since 1960, the average of current SADC countries showed greater export diversification, as 
measured by the number equivalent Herfindahl index, than ECOWAS or Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Cabral and Veiga, 2010, graph 8). It is seen that improving the education standards of the 
labor force (measured by the share of GDP spent in education or the World Bank index about 
“building human resources”) is associated with export diversification. Moreover, lower levels 
of education are associated positively with diversification while higher levels are associated 
with export sophistication. While equations in which diversification and sophistication were 
used to explain GDP growth suggested a positive but not robust relationship, higher 
diversification and sophistication were associated to lower variation in the rate of growth of 
both GDP and per capita income. The estimated coefficients suggest that a 10% per cent 
increase in diversification leads to a 4,6% decrease in the variation of GDP growth and to a 
4,4% reduction of income per capita variability. Similar results were obtained for 
sophistication, with country fixed effects model suggesting that increasing sophistication may 
have a stronger marginal effect in decreasing economic instability than diversification in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In addition, higher diversification and sophistication are associated with lower 
infant mortality and the higher life expectancy. The estimated coefficients are robust and the 
impact independent of that of diversification and sophistication on income per capita, which is  
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all the more relevant as higher average income does not necessarily translate in better life for 
the majority of the population.  
 
Export diversification in Mozambique and Cape Verde also tend to be higher than the Sub-
Saharan Africa average but the number equivalent varies a great deal (Cabral and Veiga, 2010 
graph 9): data for Cape Verde begins in 1976 and in Mozambique recent large scale 
investments determined both a strong increase in the exports and an increase in specialization. 
The decrease in export diversification in Mozambique followed a strong expansion of one 
single industrial product rather than from a decrease in the exports of other products. Figures 
4.1a and b, second panel show the comparative pattern of the number equivalent for ECOWAS 
and SADC countries respectively while Figures 4.2a and b below, third panel compare Cape 
Verde and Mozambique to the group average.  
 
Export diversification and sophistication in Cape Verde and Mozambique relative to the 
average in Sub-Saharan Africa are shown in Cabral and Veiga (2010, graphs 9 and 10). With 
respect to diversification, Cape Verde ranks higher, whereas Mozambique has improved 
sophistication. In this regard, Cape Verde is close to 6000 while ECOWAS is around 5000, 
even though in the early nineties it decreases to 3000 and 2000 respectively. Mozambique with 
a lower sophistication than SADC during the nineties but its sophistication increased sharply 
since 2000 overcoming that of SADC. The average annual change in the number equivalent 
for 5 year periods in Cape Verde and ECOWAS shows that, from 1976 to 2005, a new good 
was being exported by Cape Verde approximately every five and a half years (1/0.18=5.55). In 
Mozambique there was significant diversification up to the late seventies while SADC was 
actually concentrating. However, from the eighties on, concentration was large, especially in  
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the early nineties and between 2001 and 2005. During the latter period, on average, every two 
years a product stopped being exported (1/0.48). 
 
With this in mind, in this section we seek to identify macro-level policy and institutional 
combinations underpinning successful export diversification and economic convergence in 
ECOWAS and SADC. Just as important, we also expect to establish context-based objective 
metrics that will subsequently allows us to better assess the relative performance of Cape 
Verde and Mozambique on both counts in conjunction with evidence of a case-study nature. 
This indirect approach to study trade-related development success in these two countries is 
unavoidable as the severe lack of data prevents us from analyzing them empirically. Our study 
covers the period 1960-2004 and uses annual data obtained from various sources (see 
Appendix 1 for full details, including summary statistics, on variables used in our estimations). 
Before presenting qualitative results from the econometric analysis, a snapshot of eight 
indicators used in the empirical analysis can be seen in Appendix 2 Figures 1a, b, for each one 
of the member countries in ECOWAS and SADC respectively. Panels 1 through 8 report the 
following variables, Convergence: Income Gap to Frontier, Country and U.S. GDP per capita, 
constant 2000 USD; Diversification: Number Equivalent Index of exports at 1,2,3,4,5 digit 
SITC; Monetary stability: Inflation in consumer prices; Fiscal sustainability: Government 
Surplus/Deficit % GDP; Trade openness: Exports plus Import % GDP; Political Freedom; 
Economic Freedom; Life expectancy at birth. We also depict the relation between 
diversification and convergence for Cape Verde and Mozambique over time and also with 
respect to their respective regional averages. Figures 4.1a, b compare convergence and 
diversification indicators in panels 1 through 3 and show the time series of Income Gap and 
Number Equivalent for Cape Verde and ECOWAS, Mozambique and SADC in panels 2 and 3 
respectively. Figures 4.2a, b show the relation between same variables in terms of the raw data  
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and country means in panels 1 and 2 respectively. The raw data, country means and time 
means for the relation between Income Gap and Government Deficit is shown in Figures 4.3a, 
b panels 1 through 3 and the relation between Economic and Political Freedom in Figures 
4.4a, b panels 1 and 2. Account is taken of the different performances by defining “high” and 
“low” regimes in terms of the variables of interest and Figures 4.4a, b panel 3 compare the 
relation between Economic and Political Freedom for the full sample and the two regimes. 
Figures 4.5a, b panels 2 through 7 present the indicators in Appendix Figures 1a, b, panels 2 
through 7, while growth in GDP per capita replaces the distance to frontier in Figures 4.5a, b 
panel 1. The insights obtained from these graph, as well those from the LOWESS plots 
(Figures 4.2a, b - 4.4 a, b) will help us to better understand and interpret our results, especially 
with respect to variables identified as being highly significant in our econometric analysis
26.  
 
The first LOWESS plot clearly depicts the expected (negative) relation between 
diversification and convergence when using the country means, i.e. mean ygap and mean neq5 
for each country (Figure 4.2a, b). When all observations are taken into account, the same is 
true for SADC but there is no discernible relation between the two variables for ECOWAS.  It 
is also clear that the strong negative relation exhibited by SADC is largely attributable to 
South Africa’s high level of diversification. Once we exclude South Africa from the sample, 
we observe that the relation in now ambiguous and not dissimilar to that of ECOWAS. 
Regarding government deficits, we observe that lower budget deficits are associated with 
increased convergence, especially when they are less than 6% of GDP for ECOWAS and 
around 8% for SADC (Figure 4.3a, b). As for the relation between political and economic 
                                                 
26 LOWESS, or locally weighted scatter plot smoothing, is a method that fits simple regression models to 
localized subsets of the data. The objective is to build up a function that describes, point by point, the 
deterministic part of the data’s variability. For further details, see Cleveland’s (1979) seminal contribution and 
also subsequent developments by Cleveland and Devlin (1988). Note that we only present those LOWESS plots 
in which there is clear and interpretable relationship between the variables under consideration. The others are 
available from the authors upon request.  
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freedoms, it is clearly positive in both regions but more so for SADC based on the visual 
inspection of the LOWESS plot obtained using all observations (Figure 4.4a, b). When one 
uses country averages instead, we see that there is an unequivocal positive relation between 
freedoms in SADC (Figure 4.4b panel 2) while it is somewhat “u-shaped” in ECOWAS, 
(Figure 4.4a panel 2) which possibly reflects the fact that the region aggregates countries with 
dissimilar characteristics on this score. 
 
Turning to our empirical analysis, we adopt a system equation approach mainly because we 
believe that it is better suited to model interdependence between variables. We also seek to 
address the problem of endogeneity due to simultaneity bias and so make use of the standard 
Three-Stage Least Square method (3SLS). This method incorporates uses all the information 
provided by the exogenous right-hand-side (RHS) variables to instrument the endogenous 
(LHS) left-hand-side variables. As such, it avoids the potential pitfall of having to find “good” 
instruments within a single equation context. Notwithstanding this advantage, we recognize 
that 3SLS may be more sensitive to the existence of spurious correlations or multi-
collinearities among the regressors in one equation, thereby "contaminating" the remaining 
equations. In our sample, this does not seem to be an issue, however. In order to assess the 
robustness our method, we also estimated the diversification-convergence relation using 
alternative estimation techniques, namely Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least 
Square (2SLS). Since the results obtained are broadly consistent Tables 4.1a and b present the 
3SLS results while the others are in Appendix 2.  
 
As for our dependent variables, we measure the distance of a country’s GDP per capita (ypcit) 
compared to that of the United States (ypcUSA,t) in order to capture economic convergence. 
Specifically, the income gap is calculated as ygapit = 1 – (ypcit / ypcUSA,t), which implies that  
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the income gap narrows as ypcit  increases.  We measure export diversification using the 
number equivalent index (neq5it), which is calculated as the inverse of the Herfindahl Index 
(5-digits, SITC rev.2). Together with additional control variables, we expect these two 
variables to be a meaningful characterization of each country’s diversification-convergence 
regime, which will be affected by the interaction between policy and institutional variables. 
Accordingly, we specify the following two-equation simultaneous system for our analysis: 
(1)  ygapit  =  α1.neq5it + δ1.(Policyit)+ β1.(Institutionsit) +γ1.Z1it + ε1.it 
(2) neq5it =  α2. ygapit + δ2.(Policyit)+ β2.(Institutionsit) + γ2.Z2it + ε2.it 
 
where i = 1,…, N countries and  t = 1960-2004. For each country, Policyit and Institutionsit 
respectively represent economic policy variables (inflation, government deficit and degree of 
openness) and institutional ones (political and economic freedom, age of constitution, age of 
democracy, number of prior transitions to dictatorship, amongst others). {Zi} denotes a set of 
control variables (see appendix 1) where the economic variables (such as capital and labor 
endowments) are used together with geographic variables (such as distance or 
landlockedness). Our initial estimation process revealed that the inclusion of certain key 
variables of interest, such as the real effective exchange rate and measures of exchange market 
pressure (EMP), dramatically reduced the number of observations that were available to be 
used in our models. We subsequently dropped these variables from our analysis but evidence 
on conditional EMP is presented in the next section. 
 
Regarding our estimation strategy, we first estimate the log-log equivalent of equations (1) and 
(2) for each region in order to identify the determinants of diversification and convergence at 
the regional level. Then, we re-estimate these two equations for regional sub-samples that 
capture two different diversification-convergence scenarios. The first sub-sample, denoted as  
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the HIGH-regime, comprises countries that simultaneously exhibit high diversification and 
high convergence while the second, the LOW-regime, comprises those that exhibit the 
opposite combination. We expect that this strategy will allow us to highlight differences and 
commonalities in performance across regimes and regions.  
 
We identify the criteria used to divide the sample from the visual inspection of the partial 
relation between income gap and number equivalent index averages (see Figures 4.3a, b, 
bottom panel). We define HIGH-regime as those observations satisfying the condition {ygap < 
0.945 & neq5 > 4.5} and LOW-regime as those where {ygap >= 0.945 & neq5 <= 4.5} in the 
case of ECOWAS. In effect, we are isolating the upper-left and bottom-right quadrants for 
further analysis. Moreover, we identify Senegal as potential regional benchmark with which to 
compare Cape Verde given its high intra-regional diversification-convergence combination.  
We adopt the same conditions for SADC to facilitate inter-regional comparisons and identify 
Mauritius and South Africa as potential benchmarks. Estimation results are given in Table 
4.1a, b which includes both the full sample and two sub-samples for ease of comparison. 
(Insert Table 4.1 a, b here) 
With respect to ECOWAS, we find a two-way relationship between convergence and 
diversification but only under the HIGH-regime. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the 
impact of diversification on convergence is relatively and highly significant (-0.646 at 1% 
level). Under the LOW-regime, the relation is only 1-way as more convergence always 
increases diversification but not the other way round. For the region as whole, diversification 
increases with more convergence but more diversification actually leads to less convergence. 
This result is unexpected but plausible given the ambiguous relationship between these two 
variables in ECOWAS, as depicted in Figure 4.3a (top panel), and non-linearities that 
characterize many of the partial relations between variables.  The impact of convergence on  
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diversification is also weaker when compared to the HIGH-regime as the estimated coefficient 
is about half as large (-0.398 vs. -0.751). Together, these results appear to indicate that a 
critical level of diversification is needed before one observes a two-way relationship, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
For SADC, the two-way relationship between convergence and diversification occurs under 
the HIGH-regime and, significantly, also for the full sample. These finding contrasts with the 
one obtained for ECOWAS, where only the HIGH-regime exhibited such behavior. It is 
probably due to the influence that highly diversified countries such as South Africa and, 
perhaps to a lesser extent, Mauritius, exert on the region
27. It may also be due to the fact that 
SADC is almost 70% more diversified than ECOWAS (6.47 vs 3.83 mean neq5 as reported in 
table A1.1). In contrast, the two-way relation is positive under the LOW-regime: more 
diversification leads to less convergence and less convergence leads to more diversification. 
This result implies that SADC countries experiencing low levels of diversification may well 
need to specialize in order to ensure more convergence. This could be the rationale for 
Mozambique’s move towards lower diversification, albeit accompanied by higher GDP per 
capita growth rates, as discussed below. 
 (Insert Figure 4.6a, b here) 
 
In order to better interpret our empirical findings, as well as to highlight possible differences 
and commonalities in performance, we also look at how key model variables differ across 
HIGH and LOW regimes for each country (see Figure 4.6a, b). Note that we use each 
country’s of GDP per capita growth rate in lieu of its rate of convergence to the income 
frontier as the latter measure would also reflect changes in the United States’ GDP per capita. 
                                                 
27 Indeed, our initial OLS and 2SLS scoping estimations indicated that the determinants of diversification and 
convergence are broadly similar for ECOWAS and SADC when South Africa is excluded from the latter sample. 
These results are available from the authors upon request.  
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Interestingly, almost all of the highly diversified countries in ECOWAS register negative GDP 
per capita growth rates with the exception of Cape Verde. Indeed, it is striking that Cape Verde 
exhibits not only the highest GDP per capita growth rate in ECOWAS but also one that is 
fairly consistent across both regimes. This finding accords with our findings in section 3 and is 
also reflected in our estimates, as the Cape Verde dummy contributes towards more 
convergence under the full sample.  Moreover, its effect for the Cape Verde dummy is almost 
on par as that of the benchmark. Note also that while Cape Verde is not as diversified as 
Senegal, it has increased its number equivalent appreciably between regimes as a result of its 
positive diversification trend over time.  
 
For SADC, GDP per capita growth rates are positive under the HIGH-regime with the 
exception of Madagascar, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In the case of Mozambique, however, 
the move towards less diversification is accompanied by positive GDP per capita growth, 
which appears to be a notable reversal of fortunes.  Indeed, Mozambique’s growth under the 
LOW-regime compares very favorably with that of Mauritius, which is highly diversified and 
so has no observations falling in the LOW-regime sub sample (see Figure 4.5b). 
 
Turning to the other policy variables, we find that more inflation leads to more convergence 
under the full-sample and LOW-regime. In the case of the latter, more inflation also leads to 
diversification as does a higher budget deficit. This result could mean that increased 
diversification is associated with less macroeconomic stability but this intuition needs to be 
confirmed. For the HIGH-regime, we find no relation between inflation and diversification 
while increased budget deficits lead to less diversification and have no effect on convergence. 
A greater degree of openness leads to less diversification and more convergence under this 
regime and has no impact whatsoever on the others. Our reading of Figure 4.5a reinforces  
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these findings: inflation is generally lower under the HIGH-regime for countries experiencing 
both regimes (with the exception of Ivory Coast) while government deficits are higher but 
only moderately so in most cases and always less than 10% of GDP. For Cape Verde, the result 
of government deficit consolidation as diversification increased is very clear as is the dramatic 
lowering of its inflation rate. Diversification coupled with convergence also appears to go 
hand in hand with an average degree of openness in the range of 60-80% of GDP based on 
Ivory Coast, Cape Verde and Senegal’s performance on this score.  
 
The results obtained for policy variables in SADC differ from those in ECOWAS when 
compared on a sample by sample basis. We find that more inflation leads to less convergence 
and less diversification under the LOW-regime, as does greater openness. Greater openness is 
also associated with less diversification in the full sample. Increased government deficits, lead 
to more convergence and less diversification for the same sample but increase diversification 
under the HIGH-regime. Our reading of Figure 4.5b is that more inflation, larger budget 
deficits and being less open are a greater concern for countries under the LOW-regime. 
Regarding Mozambique, the shift towards less diversification is accompanied by lower 
inflation but also higher deficits and it appears that there is scope for it to increase its degree of 
openness. With the exception of the sole effect mentioned above, we note that the effect of 
policy variables is not as pronounced under the HIGH-regime as in the others, which we take 
to be a sign of policy credibility. 
 
As for the institutional variables, convergence increases as political and economic freedom 
increases in ECOWAS. Also, there is more convergence as the age of democracy increases, 
and this holds true for the LOW-regime. However, an increase in the number of democracies 
in the system unexpectedly reduces convergence. Under the HIGH-regime, diversification  
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increases with more political and more economic freedom. In the other two cases, 
diversification is associated with more economic freedom only. Indeed, we observe that the 
effect of economic freedom is pervasive across all samples and its effect is largest precisely 
under the HIGH-regime. In the full sample, being an older democracy also leads to less 
diversification as do a larger number of prior transitions to dictatorship in the LOW-regime. 
There is also more convergence under an English legal tradition. While these results are 
interesting, they clearly need to be further explored
28.  
 
For now, we take away the insight that a positive relation must exist between economic and 
political freedoms, which may have to exceed some critical threshold, in order for there to be 
an environment conducive to convergence (full sample). In addition, economic freedom may 
be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to underpin successful diversification in 
ECOWAS. The insight applies to SADC: an increase in both political and economic freedoms 
increases convergence in both the LOW and HIGH regimes. This does not happen in the full 
sample, possibly because of a composition effect (we have the combined effect of two 
opposing effects associated with more economic freedom, which leads to more diversification 
under the LOW-sample and less under the HIGH). Moreover, an increase in both freedoms 
increases diversification under the LOW-regime but has the opposite effect under the HIGH. 
Here again, the full sample exhibits mixed results. Even though this is not the main focus of 
analysis in this section, most control variables display the expected signs
29. Additional insights 
against which to interpret both countries’ performance with respect to political and economic 
governance and the convergence-diversification relationship relative to their sub-regional 
partners is provided in the next section. 
                                                 
28 This task requires a better understanding of how freedoms interact with one another and how they relate to 
alternative legal, political and constitutional arrangements, a task initiated in Macedo et al (2007). 
29 For example, more capital and more oil both lead to more convergence while landlockedness has the opposite 
effect in ECOWAS. On the other hand, total labor force and population density, have unexpected signs.  
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5. Comparative Description of Cape Verde and Mozambique 
We seek to embed the insights from the estimation of diversification convergence regimes to 
successful development experiences in Cape Verde and Mozambique into a comparative 
description of the broad dimensions of economic growth and foreign trade on the one hand 
and macroeconomic policy and financial reputation on the other. Going back to the interaction 
between globalization and governance in Africa, section 5.3 presents progress on the MDG 
and other governance indicators.  
 
5. 1. Economic Growth and Foreign Trade  
5.1.1. Cape Verde 
During the 1970s, the growth rate of GDP was positive (0.18%) but below the ECOWAS 
average (1.18%). In contrast, it averaged 6.85% during the 1980s while ECOWAS reported a 
decline of -0.64%. The reversal of fortunes continued during the 1990s, with a growth rate 
above the ECOWAS average (3.89% vs. -0.20%) and over the 2000-6 period (1.04% vs. 
0.86%). Although the causal study of growth is beyond the scope of our research, Cape 
Verde’s improved growth performance follows the policy and institutional reforms described 
above. Describing their impact on exports, these were derived mainly from a relatively limited 
natural resource base. During 1988-1997, exports consisted mainly of primary sector products, 
namely fish and crustacean, and so were neither diversified nor high value-added.  The 1976 
decision to join ECOWAS was possibly one of the few exceptions to the otherwise 
protectionist trade policy. In practice, ECOWAS trade is of reduced importance, as ECOWAS 
members produce similar manufactured products. Clearly of greater importance was the 
decision to diversify production during 1992-6, which went hand in hand with greater trade 
openness and a market-orientated policy stance. As a result, exports grew substantially. After a  
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dramatic decline of over 40% in 1993, exports surged to almost 4% in 1997 (IMF, 1998). The 
destination of exports also changed, as these were now directed mainly towards the European 
Union, particularly Portugal and Spain. Most of the export growth, however, has been in 
tourism notwithstanding the cyclical efforts to diversify the fishing and industrial sectors since 
the 1990s.  
 
When the government shifted away from a policy of state-control to a free-market one in 
1988, tourism also began to development substantially. In line with this policy change, Werlin 
(1996) observes that this sector’s development entailed the synchronization of public and 
private investment in infrastructure. Legislation was also passed to encourage tourism, which 
included streamlining approval of qualified projects, allowing for a gaming industry and 
setting up a regulatory and enforcement framework. Furthermore, a standard service fee was 
levied on the users, as opposed to service providers, which helped finance tourism. Direct 
public investment in infra-structure construction, such as hotels and transportations, was also 
pursued. Tourism’s contribution to GDP increased from approximately 2% in 1995 to 5% in 
2000 and 10% in 2005 (Mitchell, 2008). As noted in IMF (2008a), the balance of payments 
changed from being very dependent on international aid and emigrants’ remittances to being 
based on tourism and tourism-related foreign direct investment. In 2001, services exports and 
foreign direct investment surpassed for the first time transfers as a percentage of GDP. Indeed, 
Cape Verde became the fastest growing market within the group of tourism based economies 
whose travel exports have exceeded 10% of GDP for at least one year during 1998-2007, 
reporting an average annual growth rate of tourism services around 30% during 2000-2006. 
During the same period Croatia registered an average annual growth rate of 20%, the second 
highest. Tourism is highly pro-cyclical, however, so an excessive reliance on it increases 
output volatility unless exports of goods and services are sufficiently diversified.  
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Unfortunately, tourism is absent from the OECD database used in our empirical work. 
 
When it returned to power in 2001, PAICV pursued growth-orientated policies whilst 
rationalizing and reducing import taxes and seeking to rein in the budget deficit (IMF, 2005). 
It also promoted trade integration through increased access to preferential markets, such as the 
United States (African Growth and Opportunity Act - AGOA), European Union (Cotonou 
agreement). Joining the World Trade Organization in 2008 required a transparent and 
predictable trade and foreign investment environment, which accelerated Cape Verde’s global 
integration. Although recently graduated to middle income the status, it still benefits from 
preferential market access for least developed countries. Recent governments have continued 
the reform process, including those of relevance to financial and exchange markets. Growth 
has been sustained by the service sector, namely transports, hotel and restaurants and 
communications, and also due to increased spending on education and improved governance. 
Indeed, the importance of the service sector, largely in tourism, was evident as early as 1980. 
Its continued success depends on further improving required infrastructure, namely good 
communications and a liberalized air transport market (Lourenço and Foy, 2003). Cape 
Verde’s business cycles have thus become more synchronized with developed economies 
following increasing trade and financial integration into the world economy: Ribeiro, Martins 
and Loureiro (2008) make this an argument for “euroization” and the stability of a real 
effective exchange rate where the euro and dollar shares are equal to ½ (Table 5.1) could be 
used in supporting such policy recommendation. On the other side, the labor market is 
relatively rigid and administered prices still exist e.g., in the energy sector. Thus structural 
problems persist and they make adjustment to external shocks more difficult. 
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Regarding foreign financing sources, emigrant’s remittances accounted for 12% of GDP in 
2006, and their low volatility has allowed for consumption-smoothing in response to external 
shocks. However, remittances have become more pro-cyclical in recent years, e.g. the 
correlation between (de-trended) GDP and remittances was around 65% for the period 1980-
2006. This fact may be associated with investment-driven flows rather than traditional 
consumption-smoothing behavior. Since financial flows are far more volatile and less prone to 
act as a buffer in times of crisis, this is another challenge to Cape Verde: reforms are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for success. Adequate implementation and control is 
also required to ensure that increased foreign direct investment translates into higher growth 
and employment.  
 
Industrial policy in the 1980s was characterized by less state intervention and more 
privatization, which led to the creation of a vibrant private sector that contributed positively to 
growth. On this score, the literature shows a clear link between private ownership and 
economic growth. According to Plane (1997), privatizations are a means to reduce government 
loans, equity, subsidies, and explicit or implicit government guarantees for borrowing, which 
contributes towards competitiveness and a more efficient market economy. 
 
In terms of competitiveness, the relative stability of Cape Verde’s real effective exchange rate 
since 1992 has already been mentioned. This is largely attributable to the Cape Verde Escudo’s 
peg, first to a basket of currencies during 1977-98 and to the Euro thereafter (Table 5.1). 
Exchange rate changes have thus not played a major role in engineering gains in 
competitiveness. Moreover, the low volatility reflects the control of inflation over the 1990’s.  
 
5.1.2. Mozambique  
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GDP data shows a similar, though slightly worse, comparative performance in the pre-
independence period, where the country grows at an average rate of 4.6%, while SADC 
average was close to 5%, then the period of social and political unrest, where we watch a 
general regional slowdown and a severe recession in Mozambique (an average rate of –1.6% 
while SADC  average growth rate equals 1.7%), and finally, in the post-war period, 
Mozambique grows at a fast rate (averaging about 8.5% p.a.), while the region grows at a 
considerably slower rate of 3.4%, less than half of Mozambique’s. The civil war is 
characterized by both a regional slowdown and a significant decrease in Mozambique’s GDP 
per capita. While SADC still manages to growth at a rate of less than 1% p.a., Mozambique’s 
GDP per capita falls on average 3% per year. After the severe recession of the late 1970s and 
1980s, when Mozambique fell back in comparison to its neighbors, Mozambique more than 
doubles its GDP per capita and starts to close the gap relative to the SADC average.  
 
Export specialization has gone hand in hand with GDP growth, possibly due to the mega-
project related exports, which increased appreciably since 2000. Products such as aluminum 
and electrical energy now dominate exports, while prawns or cashew lost significance. The 
average trade share of world exports more than doubled in the 2001-2006 period relative to 
1991-00 but remains lower than in comparator groups
  in Africa and Asia
30. While most 
Mozambican exports are directed to OECD countries, SADC is also a preferred destination, 
making up over 20% of the 2007 total, of which 16 is accounted for by South Africa. This 
increase is due almost exclusively to mega project-related exports, rather than a diversified 
performance associated with extensive competitiveness gain. Mozambique’s revealed 
comparative advantages are in the production of aluminum, gas, electrical energy and wood 
                                                 
30 Lledó et al. (2007) compare Mozambique with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand (ASEAN4) instead of SADC average. It rose from 0.01 to 0.02, whereas SSA rose for 
1.5 to 1.6 and ASEAN4 remained constant. Since the early 1990s, exports have expanded at an average rate of 
10 % per year. According to 2007 WTO Trade Policy Review, exports reached over $2.4 billion.  
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articles, reflected in terms of trade which improved significantly more than in comparator 
groups in Africa and Asia. As aluminum prices rose, the terms of trade improved by 7% in 
2001-06 as opposed to 0.5% during 1991-2000. These industrial exports are directed mainly to 
developed countries, whose share in the share in total exports toward those countries from 
40.1% in 1991-01 to 63.9% in 2002-05 (Lledó et al, 2007, p. 61). Considering traditional 
exports, Mozambique’s main agricultural exports are cashew nuts, sugar cane, cotton fiber and 
timber. Other products include sisal, tobacco and fruits such as banana, citrus and mango. The 
main fisheries product, prawns (shrimp), continues to be among the country's top exports (and 
the largest agricultural export in 2007). Unlike the typical cases of export specialization, in 
Mozambique, these
  grew by an annual average rate of 4% whereas the growth of mega 
project-related exports was over 10% yearly, on average (additional evidence in Easterly and 
Resheff, 2010).  
 
In terms of competitiveness, Mozambique’s real effective exchange rate (shown in Table 5.1, 
with euro and dollar shares equal to ½) has tracked the SADC average since the mid-1990s 
whereas before it was clearly less competitive than the sub-region. Nevertheless, both 
Mozambique and SADC are less competitive than South Africa, especially in recent years. 
Based on our reading of the 2006 and 2007 World Bank Enterprises Surveys in section 5.3, 
trade liberalization has yet to yield substantial improvements in firm-level competitiveness. 
While Mozambique has better infrastructures (particularly on water, electricity and internet), 
less corruption and a generally better regulatory environment than SADC, PALOP and Sub-
Saharan Africa, it has less developed financial markets, a state where rule of law grounded, 
less export-oriented firms and less technology licensed to foreigners than the benchmarks 
(additional evidence in La Porta and Schleifer, 2010). 
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Notwithstanding the progress achieved thus far, Mozambique also faces a number of 
challenges. As it depends on foreign aid, revenue and administration reform as well as a 
stronger fiscal regime towards mineral and oil resources will be required for the government to 
enforce an “exit strategy” which enables it to raise revenue for its own, to finance at least 
current expenditure as soon as the MDGs are achieved (Lledó et al., 2007). While it is true that 
Mozambique has a strong export record when one considers its share of world exports over the 
last few years, this achievement has been primarily due to specific mega-projects, most 
noticeably in the aluminum sector. Moreover, its trade pattern is sometimes the result of 
protectionist policies, such as tax exemptions and qualification as export-processing zones that 
allow companies to import goods duty free and benefit from tax incentives. Two examples are 
the sugar and cashew industries. In the late 1990’s, an import tax on sugar led to increased 
domestic sugar production and an export tax on raw cashew nuts penalized small exporters 
while encouraging small and medium-sized cashew processing. In this case, the pattern of 
specialization is clearly linked not only to comparative advantage but also to trade policy.  
 
That said, Mozambique’s trade regime is not too restrictive. In 2006, the average tariff was in 
line with the rest of SADC, there were no significant non-tariff barriers according to the IMF 
and the process of tariff disarmament will likely continue. As a result, the maximum tariff has 
declined from 35% in 1999 to 20% in 2006. Mozambique’s business environment is still 
relatively weak. The Ease of Doing Business indicators for 2006 suggest that custom 
procedures, business registration and contract enforcement still perform poorly against other 
SADC members. Mozambique was one of the countries that benefited most from the 
initiatives for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Multilateral Debt Relief (IMF, 2008b). 
Coupled with a cautious macroeconomic stance, debt relief has allowed for increased 
spending, especially in the health and education sectors. However, long-term fiscal  
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sustainability hinges crucially on the widening of the tax base and on economic growth 
underpinned by high-quality structural investments. 
 
5.2. Macroeconomic Policy and Financial Reputation 
5.2.1. Exchange Market Pressure  
The empirical results in section 4 did not use EMP and real effective exchange rate indices due 
to database incompatibilities but they did establish that lower budget deficits (less than 7% of 
GDP) are associated with convergence for both ECOWAS and SADC. Not unrelated, Cape 
Verde and Mozambique also compare favorably to respective sub-regional averages in 
financial reputation. As discussed in Macedo et al. (2009), this can be proxied by EMP, a 
weighted sum of the nominal depreciation rate, changes in foreign reserves (excluding gold) 
and changes in the interest rate differential (from International Financial Statistics and central 
banks’ websites), i.e. 
) (
*
t t i t r t t i i r e EMP           
The weights for reserves and for the interest rate differential are given by the standard 
deviation of depreciation relative to the respective variable, to avoid that the most volatile 
components of EMP dominates the others. As mentioned, according to the governance 
indicators reported in Table 3.7, Cape Verde compares well to the ECOWAS average. Lopes 
and Santos (2010) note, however, that this institutional portrait misses the “financial 
credibility factor” which they analyze through EMP using monthly data from 1990 to 2005, 
both in a descriptive sense and in a model-dependent framework. Mozambique’s mixed record 
compared to the SADC average is shown in Table 3.7. Yet it behaves well in terms of political 




Lopes and Santos (2010) distinguish between fixers and floaters as follows. The seven Franc 
CFA countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo) and Guinea-
Bissau peg to the euro in ECOWAS while Seychelles and Zimbabwe peg to the dollar in 
SADC
32. Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia are floaters in ECOWAS and Zambia, 
Tanzania, Mauritius, Malawi, Madagascar and South Africa are floaters in SADC. They also 
find that real exchange rate depreciation improves financial reputation in Cape Verde while 
doing the opposite in Benin, where it increases EMP mean and volatility.  
 
If financial reputation is defined as low EMP with low volatility, then fixers behave better than 
floaters both in ECOWAS and SADC. Conditional volatility and mean EMP, reported in 
Figures 5.1a, b and 5.2a, b for ECOWAS (without Nigeria) and SADC (without South Africa), 
strengthen conclusions from the unconditional volatility and mean EMP. Comparing 
Mozambique’s EMP performance to SADC except South Africa (which dominates the 
weighted average), Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland because they are pegged to the 
rand, and Zimbabwe because of the huge devaluations in 1998 and 2000, the standard 
deviation of Mozambique’s EMP has converged to that of Seychelles. The fixers, taken as a 
whole, behave very similarly to South Africa, given that Lesotho and Namibia are pegged to 
the rand and Botswana is pegged to a basket of currencies where the South African rand has an 
overwhelming weight. From 1994 to 2008, Mozambique’s EMP mean has behaved similarly 
to the one of South Africa but, from 1999 on, its volatility has converged more sharply 
towards the one of Seychelles. Mozambique also has a few EMP “crises” (taken to be extreme 
values of EMP), none of which severe, behaving better on this account than several economies 
                                                                                                                                                          
31 Figure 1 in Lopes and Santos (2010) shows the tremendous improvements in Mozambique as soon the war is 
over, compared to SADC and Great Britain. Again it misses the “financial credibility” factor. 
32 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland peg to the rand so they float relative to the dollar. Lopes and 
Santos (2010) acknowledge that this makes them effectively neither fixers nor floaters but a third category.  
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in the region, such as Tanzania, Mauritius and Malawi. In SADC, the gap between fixers and 
floaters is not as wide as in ECOWAS.  
 
For the impact of domestic credit in EMP variance, Mozambique appears with a positive 
relationship that indicates the opposite of Cape Verde. It seems that these countries did not 
avoid the volatility and uncertainty on EMP with monetary expansions through domestic 
credit. But if we complement this result with the one obtained for the coefficient of domestic 
credit variation in the mean equation for Mozambique, then volatility is not as harmful given 
that Mozambique was able to reduce its mean EMP when credit was expanded, although they 
did not behaved so well in controlling the volatility. In Mozambique, moreover, the initial real 
depreciation is followed by nominal depreciations, which increase EMP and incite speculation.  
 
In the SADC floaters group, Mauritius and South Africa display the most credible results on 
our key indicators, as well as other coefficients. However, Mozambique has also some positive 
conclusions, as the risk-return relationship or the domestic credit effect on the EMP mean. 
Cape Verde has had a remarkable degree of credibility and sophistication of its exchange 
markets, undoubtedly due to the quality of the institutional framework. Due to its natural focus 
on political freedom and accountability, the governance indicators presented in Table 3.7 and 
below overlook the effect of financial expectations. Mozambique, too, despite lagging behind 
Cape Verde, has also some good results, very much in line with other floaters in the region, 
and better in some accounts (namely, the absence of any severe crises, a conditional volatility 
close to a fixer’s and a risk-return effect pointing the right way unlike many other countries in 
the region). While Mozambique’s financial reputation is weaker than Cape Verde’s, it seems to 
be heading the right way. We now described the foreign exchange market in greater detail for 
each one of the two countries.   
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5.2.2. Cape Verde  
On this score, Cape Verde’s track record improved substantially given that, following 
independence, high budget deficits were the order of the day. The reason for expansionary 
fiscal policy was the relatively large expenditures required to improve living conditions, run 
the state-controlled industrial sector and pay for the high level of imports. The deficit was also 
high due to interest payments on domestic and foreign debt, leading to a loss of foreign 
exchange reserves and financial reputation. It was only in the late 1990s that the deficit was 
reduced. This change was accompanied by measures to control inflation and strengthen the 
financial sector. In 1997, a program was adopted that did away with domestic bank financing 
to be substituted by that obtained from foreign sources. As a result, the 1998 budget deficit 
was financed entirely by foreign creditors whereas domestic creditors had accounted for 10% 
of GDP and foreign one almost 1% in 1997. The peg to the Euro, which allowed for low 
inflation rates and increased financial reputation, was crucial in obtaining the needed 
international finance. The government also speeded up the privatization process, improved tax 
collection and increased the recovery of debt obligations from public enterprises. Current 
primary expenditure was curtailed to offset higher interest revenue and the government 
abstained from pre-financing donor-supported investment projects. The composition of the 
expenditures was also modified while maintaining their level. With these measures, the 
budgetary position changed from a deficit 15.1% of GDP in 1997 to a surplus of 0.5% in 2000.  
 
The 2001 elections brought about some fiscal slippage but the newly elected PAICV 
government then sought to reduce the deficit, as well as domestic and external public debt, 
without overly increasing the tax burden. More recent reforms have streamlined and 
rationalized taxes on imports, accompanied by a general reduction of customs duties and  
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excises. At the same time, public spending was redirected towards education, health, and other 
priority areas, in accordance with the government’s poverty reduction strategy.  Transfers and 
subsidies were also reduced substantially, notably subsidies to large public enterprises. As a 
consequence, current revenues increased from approximately 21% of GDP in 2001 to 23% of 
GDP in 2004, while current public expenditures were kept constant at around 21%-22% of 
GDP during the same period. The adoption of an IMF mid-term program in 2006, supported 
by a new non-financial instrument – Policy Support Instrument (PSI) – confirmed Cape 
Verde’s commitment to maintain the pace of reforms and close dialogue on macro-economic 
policy. The program, which will be completed in 2010, will assist Cape Verde in reducing 
fiscal risks and minimize the impact of external shocks on its economy by promoting the 
necessary structural reforms under IMF advice and supervision. While AEO (2010) maintains 
a positive assessment on financing, the threats to the EU financial system are bound to have a 
negative effect going forward. 
 
In 1976, Banco de Cabo Verde started operations, succeeding to Banco Nacional Ultramarino 
(the former issuing bank) and Banco de Fomento Nacional (a state-owned development bank). 
The currency was pegged to the Escudo but in 1977, following Portugal’s devaluation, the peg 
shifted to a basket of currencies. During the eighties, several reforms were put in place, 
namely through the use of information and communication technologies in the central 
administration and a network of bank offices spreading through the archipelago: A newly 
created investment department managed programs supporting productive activities. From 1988 
on, a vast program of reforms began promoting trade liberalization and privatizations while 
the government remained responsible for infrastructures. Successive governments continued 
these reforms, accompanied by an increasing concern with the role of education and good  
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governance. High growth in transports, hotels, restaurants and communications was associated 
with these reforms making Cape Verde largely dependent on services by 1980.  
 
In 1990, monetary and exchange rate policies as well as the supervisory and lender of last 
resort roles of the central bank were reinforced by new by-rules but commercial and 
development activities continued until September 1993. Starting April 1st, 1998, the Cape 
Verde Escudo was pegged to the Euro in the framework of an agreement with Portugal 
Ribeiro, Loureiro and Martins (2008) describe the agreement while Macedo and Pereira 
(2006) associate it with a substantial reduction in EMP and lower inflation, as described 
above. In 2002, deficit financing by the central banking was also formally prohibited. In 
practice, the government has not needed to rely on this type of financing due to the receipt of 
donor-aid and the sale of treasury bonds with medium-term maturities. Fiscal policy has also 
been prudent with a medium-term fiscal strategy for 2008-2010 approved by the IMF. Fiscal 
reforms were accompanied by an increase in tax effort, particularly of income tax, as corporate 
tax rates are still relatively low. Together, this environment of fiscal responsibility has allowed 
Debt Sustainability Analysis to classify Cape Verde’s debt risk as low. The external position 
continues to depend on transfers, mostly migrants remittances. The decreasing role of transfers 
and the increasing role of portfolio and direct investment from abroad erodes remittances’ role 
as a buffer for households. It is likely that second and third generation emigrants will be less 
inclined to send remittances and will only invest in Cape Verde when it is profitable to do so. 
The government will have to take cognizance of this fact when designing and implementing its 
medium-term development strategy.   
 
5.2.3. Mozambique  
Mozambique’s economic recovery in recent years has clearly entailed a more effective and 
prudent fiscal policy. After the 1992 peace-accord, there was a significant reduction of current  
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expenditures (from 20% in 1992 to 10% three years later). In fact, except during 2000-02, 
revenues have exceeded current expenditure since 1995, while investment expenditure (mainly 
on mega project-related investments) has been paid with grants. Such a strategy, in 
combination with a sound monetary policy (particularly since 1996-97) and significant trade 
liberalization (as discussed above), has allowed for higher growth rates, private investment 
and lower inflation. We also observe a shift in the utilization of public resources, with new 
emphasis being given to sectors such as health, education and agriculture, along a poverty-
reduction strategy undertaken principally since 1998
33. At present, it seems that budget 
equilibrium is not a goal for the Mozambican policymakers. Moreover, the tax effort is still 
very low, although it has increased recently. As such, it is important for government to 
increase taxes on big projects and to create procedures that increase compliance in order to 
widen the future tax base. 
 
Mozambique’s currency, the Metical, was created in June, the 16th, 1980 by Law 2/80 and the 
colonial administration’s banknotes ceased to circulate. The first credit conceded by the 
International Development Association, though, was only granted in 1985; the second was in 
1987 and successive agreements were signed in the following years. Mozambique has 
benefited widely of the support of the IDA, either financially, or through its technical 
expertise. The main accomplishments, as reported in IDA (2007), involve the liberalization of 
trade, financial sector reform (with a separation between the commercial and central banking, 
with competition in commercial banking, improved health conditions, good investment 
climate and privatizations in several sectors. On January, 31st, 1987, the Metical was pegged 
to the US dollar instead of being pegged to a basket of six currencies reflecting shares in 
                                                 
33 For instance, according to official budget figures, from 1998 to 2000, health and education accounted for 26-
28 % of central governmental spending.  
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goods and services transactions but authorities reverted to a basket of ten currencies in April 
1988. 
 
In the late eighties/early nineties, policymakers started aiming at transforming Mozambique in 
a market economy. Throughout 1989, several capital account liberalization measures were 
pursued: agencies of the Bank were allowed to conduct foreign operations (April) and private 
financial firms were given more freedom to conduct foreign exchange operations (July). On 
November, 30, finally, the new Constitution declared that Mozambique would aim at being a 
market economy. 
 
In May 1993, interest rates were semi-liberalized and left to the free market, with the Central 
Bank determining maximum and minimum bounds. On June, exchange rates from the 
Secondary and Official Exchange Markets were unified. By 1994, the interest rates were 
completely liberalized. Through the following years, several liberalizing measures were 
undertaken and the legal foundations of the exchange market were perfected. 
 
In June 1999, in a move that was very important for Mozambique’s development, external 
debt in the amount of $ 3.7 billion is erased by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
of the IMF. In 2000, a reinforced initiative was put in place to the favor of Mozambique. In 
2003, further measures were taken to ease capital operations by non-residents in the Stock 
Exchange. In fact, AEO (2008) claims that debt relief in the early 2000s was a condition for 
most of the development Mozambique is experiencing today. In 2005, Banco de Moçambique 
started intervening in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market through weekly auctions of 
foreign exchange and a Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was launched.  
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Mozambique’s inflation rate has been under control for some time now and it now ranks 
amongst the lowest in the SADC. Indeed, the control of inflation control has been the main 
objective of monetary policy since 1987, upon the approval of an economic recuperation plan, 
and even more so since the early 1990s. The data shows that Mozambique managed to control 
inflation since 1991, averaging consistently below its SADC counterparts, and particularly 
Angola. The inflation rate has been about half of the average in SADC since the nineties. This 
accomplishment is significant if we consider that in this period Mozambique experienced a 
transition from a central-planned, public-owned economy to a free-market economy, which is 
known to create an upward pressure on inflation
34. More recently, Banco de Moçambique has 
also adopted several important measures, namely daily liquidity forecasting and sterilization of 
changes in the monetary base, which improved the conduct of monetary policy.  
 
This relative stability in inflation has been accompanied from the 1990’s onward by a steady 
depreciation of the Mozambican Metical’s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, which is in 
line with other depreciation rates of SADC currencies. Regarding its external position, 
Mozambique has experienced trade deficits and negative factor incomes balances, which have 
been partially compensated by transfers (with the exception of 2006, where transfers were in 
excess of the shortfalls). The trade balance improved up till 2006 due to high aluminum prices 
and export growth of cashew nuts, sugar, prawns and tobacco. However, the increase in the oil 
price and a decrease in traditional exports in 2007 deteriorated the trade balance. Indeed, 
financing a current account deficit which reached 22% of GDP in 1999 required debt relief.  
 
5.3. Millennium Development Goals and Governance Indicators 
                                                 
34 See Andersson and Sjöö (2002) for the structural adjustment’s impact on inflation.   
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The information on MDG is drawn from a report prepared at the request of the Guinean 
presidency of CPLP (IICT, 2007) and from AEO: the %age of satisfactory outcomes in 
PALOP is 31% according to the first source but 26% according to the second, as shown in 
Table 5.2. The corresponding percentage for the whole AEO sample of 53 countries is 31% in 
2007 and 41% in 2009 and 2010. Fewer entries with missing data appear in AEO (2009, 2010) 
than in previous issues, at least for PALOP, and the criteria used seem to have stabilized 
together with the percentage. The ranking found in the first source remains that found in 
Tables 3.3 through 3.5, Cape Verde followed closely by Sao Tome and Mozambique only 
marginally above Guinea Bissau and Angola, whereas the Sao Tome and Mozambique have 
the same average AEO score. Table 5.3 provides more detail on the quantified MDG presented 
in Table 5.2 and compares Cape Verde and Mozambique to the ECOWAS and SADC average 
as before. 
 
(Insert Tables 5.2 and 5.3 here) 
 
On the eradication of poverty, Cape Verde has one of the lowest shares of the poorest quintile 
in national consumption. Using the data available, we see that it is slightly worse than the 
average ECOWAS member. Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007) argue that relative poverty 
increased between the 1988/89 and 2001 surveys, based on the increase in the Gini coefficient 
from 50.2% to 53.83%), while absolute poverty measures decreased dramatically. 
Mozambique, meanwhile, has a slightly larger share (5.4%) of consumption of poor people 
when compared to the SADC average. Although the US has a comparable figure, its definition 
of poverty is a relative and not an absolute one. In view of Mozambique’s recent evolution 
IMF (2008) considered it likely that this goal will be attained by 2015 and the 2009 and 2010 
AEO %ages of satisfactory performance are uniformly better than in 2007. In fact they are 
higher in 2010 than in 2009 so that they do not yet show any effect of the crisis - except for  
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objectives 5 and 7, maternal mortality and access to water, which fall to one half of the 
previous value.  
 
On MDG 2, net enrolment in primary education, Cape Verde has actually decreased slightly. 
However, the enrolment level is very high even by the developed world’s standards. Notably, 
Cape Verde is well ahead its ECOWAS partners, which reflects its focus on education and the 
quality thereof. For Mozambique, the net enrolment in primary education has increased 
significantly since the 1990’s, especially during 2000-06. Indeed, Mozambique has improved 
remarkably when compared to most SADC countries but stills lags behind them. The same can 
be said for its level of literacy. On MDG 3, gender parity, Cape Verde is better placed than its 
ECOWAS partners but some of them are now catching-up fast. Gender parity in Mozambique 
is one of the poorest in SADC but, at the same time, it registers a sustained and strong 
improvement. With respect to child mortality, MDG 4, Cape Verde’s is by far the lowest in 
ECOWAS but still far short of the level in developed countries. Even so, it has decreased 
significantly. On this score, Mozambique is improving rapidly, as its child mortality rate has 
decreased to 153.67 per thousand, which is much better than the SADC average. IMF (2008) 
foresees that this MDG will probably be reached by 2015. For maternal health, MDG 5 (for 
which there is only one observation, and a higher percentage of satisfactory performance was 
reached in 2009 than in 2010), Cape Verde is the best in ECOWAS. Mozambique’s maternal 
mortality rate was below the SADC average in 2005, which is in line with the improvement in 
child mortality and in public health as a whole. MDG 6, the incidence, prevalence and death 
rates associated with tuberculosis, show much lower figures in Cape Verde than for ECOWAS. 
There is no data on HIV prevalence in Cape Verde as far as we are aware. The prevalence and 
death rate of tuberculosis grew more in Mozambique than in SADC members while 
HIV/AIDS statistics show a worrying increase in infection rates among young people.  
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The goal of sustainable development is often proxied by the proportion of the population 
having access to safe drinking water source. It is much higher in Cape Verde than in 
ECOWAS.  Similarly, the proportion of the urban population is also higher in Cape Verde but 
a significant catching-up is noticeable in ECOWAS member states. In Mozambique, the 
proportion of population having access to improved sanitation facilities has increased from 
22% to 31 % between 1995 and 2006: it lags behind other SADC partners but is quickly 
narrowing the gap. The same can be said of the proportion of the population living in slums, 
which has fallen drastically since 2001 (whereas in the SADC partners the reduction has been 
modest). The weak spot of this MDG lies in the water quality since the improvement in the 
proportion of population having access to an improved drinking water source has been 
negligible while the proportion of the urban population has actually decreased from 83% to 
71% when comparing 1995 to 2006. This is again a case where the %age of satisfactory 
performance reached in 2009 was about double that reported in 2010, under 30% as opposed 
to slightly over 60%. 
 
The global partnership for development is often illustrated by debt service as a %age of 
exports of goods and services, as done in Table 5.3. This has been historically lower in Cape 
Verde when compared to ECOWAS and has decreased over time, but ECOWAS decreased 
more markedly when looking at the year-by-year numbers. Mozambique’s debt service has 
fallen markedly and the period of high growth coincides with that of the donor community’s 
relief of debt, as discussed in the previous sub-section.  
 
(Insert Tables 5.4 here) 
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Coming back to the comparison of governance and freedom indicators appearing in Tables 3.4, 
3.5 and 3.7 above, Cape Verde’s Economic Freedom Index has improved since 1996, when it 
obtained 49.7 points. However, trade freedom (45), government spending (30.9), financial 
freedom (10) and freedom from corruption (30) were below average. The lack of financial 
freedom was due to commercial banks’ weak independence excessive government spending 
due to weak industrial policies in the transition to independences. Financial freedom only 
ranked higher in 2002 (50 points), when a law that gave more independence to the central 
bank was approved. As for government spending, this category reached similar values to 
current ones in 2004 (around 70 points) because political measures aimed at controlling the 
budget deficit started to be effective. In the years following 1996, the country’s score has been 
improving when compared on a year-to-year basis, except during 1997, 2003, 2005 and 2007. 
In 2010, Cape Verde reached its maximum score (61.8) and is classified as the 78
th freest 
economy in the world. Above average items include business freedom (63.3), trade freedom 
(65.5), fiscal freedom (65.6), government spending (65.3), monetary freedom (74.5) and 
property rights (65). Freedoms in need of improvement were investment freedom (69), 
financial freedom (60), freedom from corruption (51) and labor freedom (48.1). In 
comparative terms, Cape Verde ranked 7th out of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a 
regional score much higher than the average
35. Luiz et al (2010) present a set of institutional 
indicators for Mozambique for the period 1900 through to 2005, reproduced in Figure 3.3 
above. The first tracks political freedoms and is unique in its duration and complexity even 
though it correlates highly with the Freedom House combined index of political and civil 
liberties. The second index constructs a property rights measure which has not existed 
previously but also reveals a fairly strong correlation with the other index. They explain this as 
                                                 
35 This happens not only thanks to relatively good performances in the above-mentioned categories but also due 
to the fact that its regional partners perform even worse in those categories where Cape Verde performs poorly. 
For example, Cape Verde ranks 47th out of 179 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption  
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follows: “The Portuguese government during several phases of its colonial administration 
went to great lengths to develop a more formal system of property rights even whilst 
politically suppressing the participation of the vast majority of its population and this drives 
down the correlation between these two indices to 0.46 under colonialism. If we focus on the 
post 1975 period the correlation shoots up to 0.93 which indicates that a deterioration in 
political freedom from independence onwards is associated with a lack of economic freedom 
and security, whilst an improvement sees a rise in economic freedoms as well”. 
 
IICT (2007) includes the following six governance indicators from the World Bank Institute: 
freedom and accountability (FREE), stability and absence of violence (STAB), government 
efficiency (EF GV), quality of regulation (Q REG), quality of justice (JUST) and control of 
corruption (CORR) which were reported in Table 3.7 above. Good governance has been one of 
the main features of Cape Verde’s development. Rule of law and accountability stem from the 
fact that democracy is well established and that free elections take place regularly with the 
results not being disputed. The only aspect that fares worse is regulatory quality but this 
indicator still fares better than most ECOWAS member states. Education is a major concern 
for Cape Verde governments: between 1970 and 1990, the number of children leaving school 
with secondary education increased dramatically. In 1990, half of the children in rural areas 
attended secondary school and 60% of girls received secondary education in urban areas (see 
Goujon and Wils, 1996). The literacy rate in the people between 15 and 24 years old is the 
highest in all ECOWAS. With respect to Mozambique, no significant evolution is noticeable 
between 1996 and 2006 for most indicators, and then it improves gradually. The exception is 
the indicator of political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism, which has improved 
markedly.  
                                                                                                                                                          
Perceptions Index regarding the “freedom from corruption” indicator. However, Cape Verde ranks third when 
looking at only Africa countries, coming in after South Africa (first) and Botswana.     
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The 28 indicators in the 2006 and 2007 World Bank Enterprise Surveys for which both Cape 
Verde and Mozambique report at least 10 answers are in Tables 5.4, panels 1 through 5. The 
indicators for regional groupings and Sub-Saharan Africa are simple averages of the countries, 
some of which are missing (2 out of 15 from ECOWAS and SADC, 12 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa). Relative to the average of their comparator countries (in parentheses), then Cape 
Verde has more developed financial markets, greater macroeconomic stability, less corruption 
and a state where rule of law is more grounded than ECOWAS, PALOP, Sub-Saharan Africa 
but less export-oriented firms, less technology licensed to foreigners, higher taxes and a 
heavier regulatory framework than the benchmarks. Mozambique has better infrastructures 
(water, electricity and internet) and less corruption than SADC, PALOP, Sub-Saharan Africa 
but less developed financial markets, a state where rule of law is less grounded, less export-
oriented firms and less technology licensed to foreigners than the benchmarks. 
(Insert Table 5.4 here) 
6. Conclusions 
The expansion, diversification and deepening of trade and financial links between countries 
over several decades presented an unparalleled opportunity to raise living standards and 
achieve the MDG. Development success under globalization, meanwhile, is less a question of 
relative resource endowments or geographical location than in past waves of globalization. 
Moreover, adequate development responses to globalization become all the more important as 
globalization increasingly affects political and economic governance, mainly by reducing 
national policy space and increasing institutional and economic interdependence at various 
levels. Under these conditions, interactions between globalization and governance can be 
either positive or negative, depending on the orientation and predictability of economic 
policies and the accompanying institutional arrangements but also on linkages between  
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cultural, institutional and economic factors. 
 
Against this background, we want to determine whether the interaction between globalization 
and governance is positive or not in Cape Verde and Mozambique so as to assess the extent to 
which they represent development successes in West and Southern Africa. Specifically, we 
attempt to identify lessons for successful governance based on meaningful national and 
regional comparisons of Cape Verde and Mozambique's development experience. Economic 
success under globalization for these countries entails, necessarily but not exclusively, positive 
market perceptions regarding outcomes such as trade diversification and narrowing of the 
income gap relative to the frontier. This aspect of success has to be, in turn, sustained by good 
governance and level of political and economic freedom that their citizens and residents enjoy. 
As such, policy and institutional reforms provide the context against which to interpret 
governance indicators and progress towards the MDG. 
 
To identify macro-level policy and institutional combinations underpinning successful export 
diversification and economic convergence in ECOWAS and SADC, the empirical analysis 
establishes context-based objective metrics that assess the relative performance of Cape Verde 
and Mozambique in conjunction with evidence of a case-study nature. Given the severe lack 
of data over the period 1960-2004, this indirect approach to study trade-related development 
success in these two countries is unavoidable. We apply Three-Stage Least Squares and other 
estimation techniques, with broadly consistent results, to two main variables: the distance of a 
country’s GDP per capita compared to that of the United States in order to capture economic 
convergence (ygap) and the inverse of the Herfindahl Index (neq5) as a measure of export 
diversification. Together with additional control variables, these two variables are a 
meaningful characterization of each country’s diversification-convergence, which will be  
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affected by the interaction between policy and institutional variables.  
 
We first identify the determinants of diversification and convergence at the regional level. 
Then, we re-estimate the model for sub-samples that capture two different diversification-
convergence scenarios in each sub-region. The first sub-sample, denoted as the HIGH-regime, 
comprises countries that simultaneously exhibit high diversification and high convergence 
{ygap < 0.945 & neq5 > 4.5} while the second, the LOW-regime, comprises those that exhibit 
the opposite combination{ygap >= 0.945 & neq5 <= 4.5}. This strategy allows us to highlight 
differences and commonalities in performance across regimes and regions including regional 
benchmarks, viz. Senegal for ECOWAS and Mauritius and South Africa for SADC.   
 
The principal differences are that ECOWAS HIGH-regime countries are becoming more 
diversified whilst those of SADC are becoming less diversified. Opening up to trade is also an 
important driver of both convergence and diversification for the former, especially in the range 
of 45-75% of GDP, but not for the latter. In SADC HIGH-regime countries, economic and 
political freedom drive convergence, suggesting effective institutional arrangements. As for 
the commonalities or lessons present in the HIGH-regimes, we find that: 1) the expected two-
way relationship always exists; 2) convergence always entails macroeconomic stability 
(inflation < 9%, budget deficits < 7% of GDP); 3) political and economic freedoms are always 
greater, on average, when compared to the other cases; 4) freedoms always affect 
diversification policy as do government deficits, albeit in different directions across both sub-
regions. However, increasing deficits always counteract prevailing diversification stance in 
both sub-regions, which we take to be a sign of regime credibility. The comparison across sub-
regions, meanwhile, serves to highlight the importance of institutions irrespective of the 
sample chosen: economic freedom always affects diversification in ECOWAS while both  
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freedoms affect it in SADC, where they affect convergence too. Efforts at monitoring the 
MDGs complement the context for export diversification across Sub-Saharan Africa (Cabral 
and Veiga, 2010) and for financial reputation in PALOP, ECOWAS and SADC (Lopes and 
Santos, 2010). 
 
The estimated impact that Cape Verde and Mozambique have on their respective sub-regions, 
which accords with the intuition and implications of the posited two-way relationship, 
confirms the narrative of their long-term development. Based on our reading of this narrative, 
we identify the following common drivers of macro-level policy and institutional 
combinations as being associated the (different) two-way relationship of both countries: 
moving towards a market economy; opening up to regional and global trade; increasing 
economic and political freedom; pursing macroeconomic stability and financial reputation; 
ensuring policy continuity (especially in trade and industrial sectors) and focusing on human 
development (especially poverty reduction and education). These two case studies of positive 
G&G interaction reflect on the potential for cooperative governance and peer-review 
mechanisms outside of its usual domain among OECD and EU member countries. For Cape 
Verde, in particular, the effects of the “culture of peace” should be stressed again, as it helped 
sustain the move towards a market economy, through greater trade integration especially with 
the EU and the US, culminating in the membership in the World Trade Organization. Multi-
party democracy and greater political freedom and civil liberties allowed policy continuity 
across the political divide and improved human development. This is not to say that human 
development is sustainable in the face of the current global crisis. In effect, macroeconomic 
stability was threatened from outside but also through an insufficient attention to public and 
external deficits. If not appropriately monitored, this could threaten the positive interaction 
attained between globalization and governance.  
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